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PERSONALIZATION OF SMART-DEVICES: BETWEEN
USERS, OPERATORS, AND PRIME-OPERATORS
Tomer Kenneth*

Your relationships with smart-devices are about to get complicated.
The ability to operate the physical functions of smart-devices from far
away introduces new actors into the previously intimate relationship
between the user and the device—the operators. The Internet of
Things (IOT) also facilitates more complexed and nuanced use of
smart-devices, most notably enabling the personalization of a specific
device for a specific user. Together, remote operability and personalization of smart-devices bring forth a myriad of legal and social opportunities and challenges.
The Article explains the nature of personalization of smart-devices
and teases out its significant implications. Personalization of smartdevices combines the dynamic personalization of code with the influential personalization of physical space, making it easy for operators
to remotely modify the smart-device and influence specific users’ behaviors. Crucially, personalization of smart-devices can affect the creation and enforcement of law: it facilitates the application of law on
spaces and activities that were previously unreachable, thereby also
pushing toward the way for legalization of previously unregulated
spaces and activities.
The Article also distinguishes between two kinds of smart-devices
operators: ordinary and prime-operators. The Article illustrates the
challenges that ordinary operators bring forth by identifying different
kinds of ordinary operators (users, private companies, and the state)
and modes of constraints they can impose on users (notice, nudge, and
prevention). It then normatively discusses the distribution of first-order and second-order legal powers between ordinary operators.
* Doctoral (J.S.D.) Candidate, New York University School of Law; Fellow, Information
Law Institute, NYU. I thank Thomas Streinz, Anat Lior, Roy Cohen, Alma Diamond, Meir
Yarom, and James Wilson for invaluable discussions comments on earlier versions. I am also
grateful to the participants of the Yale Law School’s 9th Annual Doctoral Scholarship Conference, the participants of the Privacy Research Group at NYU School of Law, and the participants of the 15th Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Conference, for their helpful
feedback. Finally, I thank also Susan John and the law review editors for their careful editorial
work.
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Finally, the Article introduces the prime-operators of smart-devices.
Prime-operators have informational, computational, and economic
advantages that uniquely enable them to influence millions of devices
and extract considerable social value from the operation of smart-devices. Prime-operators also hold unique moderating powers—they
govern how different operators and users operate the smart-devices
and thereby influence interactions mediated by smart-devices. The
Article discusses the nature and role of prime-operators and explores
paths to regulate them.
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INTRODUCTION
Technological innovations turn traditional devices into smart-devices, which are digitally operated and connected to the internet.1
Combining these two features facilitates remote operability of smartdevices, empowering operators—users and other actors—to operate
the devices’ functions without being in the same space and time as the
device itself. In turn, remote operability introduces new actors to the
previously intimate relationship between the user and the device.
The Article will use the smart-fridge as a prime example to explore
the exciting possibilities and thorny challenges that smart-devices
bring forth. Smart-fridges’ innovative technologies facilitate various
functions that traditional fridges do not. These include the digital operation of the traditional functions of the fridge, e.g., temperature setting or opening doors; various sensors that collect information from
inside the fridge and its surroundings, e.g., noticing when the tomatoes
rot and identifying users approaching the device; connection to personal assistants’ services such as Alexa or Google Assistant, e.g., to
simplify the creation of shopping lists or to find recipes according to
the products in the fridge; and a connection to other internet services,
e.g., social media accounts or shopping websites.2
Admittedly, that smart-fridges have built-in computers, sensors, or
even small screens that provide various information about the device,
is not likely to leave anyone with a smartphone flabbergasted. However, understanding remote operability might. It allows various operators to make the smart-fridge in the users’ kitchen perform actions
that affect the user without ever stepping into the kitchen. It empowers those operators to determine when the doors will be open or
closed, what temperature to set for the dairy compartment, how to
1. In this article the phrase “traditional device” denotes the device that used for similar core
functions without the internet connectivity of the respective smart-device. For instance, traditional fridges whose functions included cooling, thermostat control, door level, and sometime
basic digital capabilities to control these functions. The relation between smart-devices and traditional devices derives from them being the same “thing” as far as the user is concerned. Michael
J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381,
389–404, 447–63 (2005) (discussing what makes a physical “thing” in law, and the expectations
towards tangible things).
2. See e.g., James Stables, Chill out, it’s our smart fridge buying guide, THE AMBIENT (Jan. 11,
2019), https://www.the-ambient.com/reviews/best-smart-fridges-356; Adrian Willings, New Alexa
devices from CES 2019: AI-powered TVs, fridges, mirrors and more, POCKET-LINT (Jan. 14,
2019), https://www.pocket-lint.com/smart-home/news/amazon/143246-the-best-new-alexa-devices-ai-powered-tvs-fridges-mirrors-and-more; Renée Lynn Midrack, What Is a Smart Refrigerator?, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/smart-refrigerator-4158327; Kari Paul,
Teen claims to tweet from her smart fridge – but did she really?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2019,
6:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/13/teen-smart-fridge-twittergrounded.
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organize the products in the fridge, or when the beer compartment
will be locked.3
This article will explore operators’ power to personalize the use of
smart-devices, and the various legal challenges that this innovative
power brings to the fore. Smart-devices often celebrate their operators’ ability to “personalize” these devices.4 As we shall see, personalization refers to physically modifying the features of the smart-devices
to prompt specific users to act in a specific way.5 This is a unique,
innovative, and influential feature of smart-devices. It invites operators to impose finer and more nuanced constraints on particular users,
thereby pushing specific users to particular outcomes, outcomes set by
the operators for those specific users.6 As smart-devices become more
abundant and the effects of personalization on users will accentuate,
scholarly attention and legal responses will be required.7
This Article contributes to the existing literature by developing
three main ideas. First, it provides a comprehensive account of personalization in the context of smart-devices, analyzing the concept and
exploring the development of innovative personalized legal and market regulations that rely on this technology.8 Second, it casts a spotlight on the new actors—the operators of smart-devices—and the
changing relationships between users and their devices.9
Third, it singles out the prime-operators, specific operators that hold
considerable powers regarding the operation of smart-devices.10 Despite escaping scholarly debates so far, prime-operators are important.
They have informational, computational, and economic advantages
3. Id.
4. The centrality of personalization can be hinted by the prominence of this function in smartfridges ads. See, e.g., New Food AI Looks Inside Your Fridge To Help You Find The Perfect
Things To Cook With What You ALREADY Have, SAMSUNG NEWSROOM, https://
news.samsung.com/us/new-food-ai-looks-inside-fridge-help-find-perfect-things-cook-already/
(last visited July 11, 2021) (featuring “personalized cooking experiences” and “personalized food
recommendations”); The Smarter Kitchen, SMARTFRIDGE, http://smartfridge.io/ (last visited July
11, 2021) (featuring “personalized food manager features” and “personalized grocery lists”);
Home is where the Hub is, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/explore/family-hub-refrigerator/overview/ (last visited July 11, 2021).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.C.1; supra note 4.
7. On the expected prevalence of smart-devices see, e.g., Paolo Collela, Ushering In A Better
Connected Future, ERICSSON, https://www.ericsson.com/en/about-us/company-facts/ericssonworldwide/india/authored-articles/ushering-in-a-better-connected-future (last visited July 11,
2021) (predicting roughly 30 billion IoT devices by 2022); A Guide to the Internet of Things,
INTEL (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/internet-of-things/infographics/
guide-to-iot.html (predicting roughly 200 billion IoT devices by 2020).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
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that enable only these types of operators to extract considerable social
value from the operation of smart-devices.11 Prime-operators also
hold unique moderating powers, enabling them to favor certain operators over others.12 The Article will argue that prime-operators of
smart-devices create legal challenges that resemble those posed by social media moderators and set the foundations for the regulatory and
scholarly discussion about prime-operators.13
Part I provides a primer to the technology of smart-devices, explains how its core features facilitate remote operation, and presents
the key opportunities and challenges that this technology holds. Part
II focuses on personalization as a unique feature of smart-devices. It
expounds upon the concept, explains the technological background,
and then illustrates how personalization of smart-devices poses new
possibilities for personalized legal and market constraints.
Part III is dedicated to personalization by ordinary operators. It illustrates and assesses the normative harms that ordinary operators
might pose, namely by combining the types of operators and methods
of constraints they could apply. It then discusses the adequate distribution of first-order and second-order legal powers to operate smartdevices. Part IV introduces the prime-operators. It explains the origin
of their power, underscores the unique legal challenges that they pose,
and suggests a legal path to regulating them. The Article concludes
with a set of considerations about the scholarship and regulation of
smart-devices.
I. PREFACE

TO

SMART-DEVICES

A. From Traditional to Smart
Smart-devices and the Internet of Things (IoT) are notoriously
tricky to define.14 Instead of grappling with a definitive definition for
this emerging technology, I shall discuss the crucial features that set
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part IV.B
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See, e.g., Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy
and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1186–88 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 823–25
(2016). The California legislature referred to smart-devices as “connected devices” and defined
them as “any device, or other physical object that is capable of connecting to the Internet, directly or indirectly, and that is assigned an Internet Protocol address or Bluetooth address.” See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.05 (West 2018). Some early references to IoT include, see generally
THE INTERNET OF THINGS, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (2005); Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321 (2007).
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smart-devices apart from traditional ones.15 Briefly, these two features
are the digitization of smart-devices’ functions and interconnectivity.
Together, they enable the computers embedded in smart-devices to
(1) operate (execute actions regarding) the various digitized functions
of the device, and (2) connect to the Internet in order to send information and receive commands.16 These features facilitate other important characteristics, such as multifunctionality, scalability, and
remote operability. Arguably, these elements also make a smartfridge part of the IoT.17 Allow me to elaborate.
To begin, consider the digitization of the devices’ functions. Most
traditional fridges include both analog and digital functions. The former include the leg-lever used to open the door, the ice trays, or the
drawers that could be manually opened, closed, or locked; the latter
include the inner computer that regulates the temperature or notifies
when the door is left open.18 Improvements in computer technology
facilitate the creation of better computers that can be embedded in
mundane devices.19 These enhanced abilities facilitate the digitization
of most of the devices’ functions, as well as adding innovative func15. I find this approach especially appealing, in light of the early stage of this technology and
its numerous unknown future implications on social lives. Here, I follow the footsteps of Justice
Frankfurter’s holding in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota: “[T]he still more subtle and complicated technological facilities that are on the horizon, raises questions that we ought not to
anticipate; certainly we ought not to embarrass the future by judicial answers which at best can
deal only in a truncated way with problems sufficiently difficult even for legislative statesmanship.” 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944).
16. Thus, to be regarded as a smart-device, a device does not have to constantly use its sensors
to collect information nor keep a permanent link with the server. Cf. Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things Is Changing
the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 894–95 (2017).
17. See, e.g., ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RES. SERV. R44227, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1–2 (2015). The definition of IoT and the relation between smartdevices and IoT is a complicated issue which will not be fully addressed in the article. See, e.g.,
Manuel Silverio-Fernández et al., What is a smart device? - a conceptualisation within the paradigm of the internet of things, 6 VISUALIZATION IN ENG’G 1 (2018); Menachem Domb, Smart
Home Systems Based on Internet of Things, in INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) FOR AUTOMATED
AND SMART APPLIANCES (2019).
18. The distinction between digital systems and analog systems and their different legal applications were discussed in the context of art and copyright, see, e.g., Jeremy Paul Sirota, Analog
to Digital: Harnessing Peer Computing, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 760–61 (2004); James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work — And It’s a Good Thing, Too,
39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 404 (2016); Brian Sheridan, The Age of Forgotten Innocence: The
Dangers of Applying Analog Restrictions to Innocent Infringement in the Digital Era, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1465–69, 1478–81 (2011).
19. For a more nuanced explanation on the computing scheme that supports IoT, see Sona R.
Makker, Overcoming “Foggy” Notions of Privacy: How Data Minimization Will Enable Privacy
in the Internet of Things, 85 UMKC L. REV. 895, 897–98, 900–03 (2017); Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1007 (2016).
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tions that traditional devices did not provide.20 The newly digitized
functions include digitally opening or closing the doors or the internal
compartments, operating ice dispensers, setting temperature, and notifying about issues like dirty filters.21 The innovative functions include various sensors that collect information about the smart-fridge
and its surroundings, including cameras that record both the inside
and outside of the fridge, or heat and humidity sensors that monitor
different compartments.22
Second, technological developments also support the devices’ interconnectivity.23 That is, the ability of the computer embedded in the
smart-device to communicate with and connect to other computers via
the Internet.24 While communicating online, each smart-device has its
own identifier, meaning its own “Internet identity” and “address,”
which allows other computers connected to the Internet to find and
communicate with it.25 This way, the computer embedded in the
smart-device exchanges information and commands with other computers connected to the Internet.26
20. See Peter Swire & Jesse Woo, Privacy and Cybersecurity Lessons at the Intersection of the
Internet of Things and Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1475, 1479–83 (2018) (explaining that alongside the computational powers of the computers of the devices, other computational improvements such as cloud computing are in order to facilitate the IoT); GAURAV
TANEJA ET AL., FUTURE OF IOT 13–14 (2019) (holding that the development of IoT technology
and especially its large-scale spread depend on the computing powers in the devices themselves,
known as “edge-computing” or “fog-computing”).
21. See supra note 2.
22. Makker, supra note 19, at 897–98, 904–06; Poudel, supra note 19, at 1003 (“Sensors, such
as cameras, thermometers, and pedometers, lie at the heart of an IoT system. These collect
varied information about the environment, such as mechanical data . . . [and] thermal data . . .
Sensors can work with actuators, output devices that implement decisions . . . [and] can also
combine to form useful applications.”).
23. On the key role of interconnectivity and smart-devices’ ability to communicate as essential
to IoT, see, e.g., FTC STAFF REPORT, INTERNET OF THINGS 5–6 (2015); Laura DeNardis & Mark
Raymond, The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475, 477
(2017); Vedang Ratan Vatsa & Gopal Singh, A Literature Review on Internet of Things (IoT), 2
INT’L J. COMPUT. SYS. 355, 356 (2015) (“What we mean by interconnectivity is the potential
various interconnections that can be made and the information can be imparted between all
objects of the IoT.”).
24. See Vatsa & Singh, supra note 23. On the role of interconnectivity in IoT, see, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 554–60
(2017); Ian Taylor Logan, For sale: Window to the Soul Eye Tracking as the Impetus for Federal
Biometric Data Protection, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 786–87 (2019); Ronald J. Hedges & Kevin
F. Ryan, The Internet of Things, 90 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J. 30 (2018).
25. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 17, at 2–3; Harris Aftab, Analysis of identifiers in IoT platforms, 6 DIG. COMMC’NS & NETWORKS 334, 334 (2020).
26. Technically speaking, the smart-fridge usually operates as a client, meaning that it receives
commands from other computers over the internet called servers that are operated by other
entities. More on servers and clients, see JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 31–33 (8th ed. 2018). For additional background on the connection and communica-
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Interconnectivity and digitization of functions work together to allow smart-fridges to perform tasks that traditional fridges cannot. One
such task is gathering information. A smart-fridge can use its sensors
to collect information and upload it to a server.27 Sensors may collect
information about the technical use of the fridge, such as measurements of the electricity consumption, the average temperature in different compartments, filters’ status, and more.28 These sensors,
specifically the cameras, can also collect information about the users
of the smart-fridge and the ways they use it.29 This includes information about the different users’ habits—tracking how often they insert
products to the smart-fridge, how often they eat certain products,
when they usually open the fridge, and even which products or features of the fridge they use at different times.30
Furthermore, the devices can also process the collected information
and use it to make distinctions: either between different users that use
the device or between different products stored in it.31 In more elaborate cases, inferences like identifying users or products, or detecting
features and patterns can be achieved.32 These inferences can be conducted by the smart-device itself (i.e., “edge computing”) or by other
tion between computers over the internet, see, e.g., Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., Internet Overview,
63 TEX. BAR J. 226 (2000); Gibran J. Peña-Porras, Joinder Is Coming: Why Denying Swarm
Joinder in BitTorrent Cases May Do More Harm Than Good, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 619–21
(2018); Aric Jacover, I Want My MP3!: Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 2213–14 (2002).
27. See supra notes 20–22.
28. These features are already available in some smart-fridges, see, e.g., the FlexZone Drawer
smart-divider function and the adjustable shelves functions in some of Samsung’s smart-fridges.
SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/home-appliances/refrigerators/4-door-flex/22-cu--ft-counter-depth-4-door-flex--with-21-5-in--connected-touch-screen-family-hub--refrigeratorrf22n9781sg-aa/ (last visited July 11, 2021).
29. See Poudel, supra note 19, at 1003–04; Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the Age of the Internet of Things, 41 HUM. RTS. 14, 14 (2016); Branden Ly, Never Home Alone: Data Privacy
Regulations for the Internet of Things, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 539, 541 (2017).
30. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98–114 (2014) (discussing the
various IoT sensors that collect information in different kinds of devices).
31. I use the term “processing” here for convenience, but the more accurate term would be
“profiling,” defined by the GDPR as “any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location
or movements.” See 2016 O.J. (L 679) 119.
32. See Peppet, supra note 30, at 130 (discussing the identification process of IoT devices by
cameras, and explaining that “sensor data capture such a rich picture of an individual, with so
many related activities, that each individual in a sensor-based dataset is reasonably unique”);
Nicholas D. Lane et al., On the Feasibility of User De-Anonymization from Shared Mobile Sensor Data, PHONESENSE, Nov. 6, 2012, at 1.
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servers that have access to the smart-devices’ gathered information
(i.e., “cloud computing”).33
Since interconnectivity allows smart-devices to perform various actions that were not possible in the traditional devices, some view
smart-devices as multifunctional,34 in the sense that they fulfill the
traditional functions as well as many new ones. They can cool your
products while also collecting data,35 connecting to social media,36 creating grocery lists,37 and more. Moreover, interconnectivity theoretically allows endless connections between devices on the same
network, which supports the scalability of smart-devices.38 Smart-devices are scalable in two manners: the ability to add more digital functions and features to a single device, and the ability to cooperate with
other devices to facilitate even more services.39 This explains the potential of smart-devices technology to significantly expand—to increase the number of smart-devices and the complexity of their
digitized functions, and thereby to influence more aspects of users’
lives.40
More importantly for our purposes, combining interconnectivity
and digitization also facilitates the remote operability of the smartfridge.41 Digitizing the smart-devices’ functions enables different actors to physically operate these functions through computer code commands, and interconnectivity allows remote operators to send such
commands to the smart-device via the Internet. Crucially, combining
the two means that the operators’ remote commands are translated to
33. See supra note 2.
34. Friedland, supra note 16, at 895 (“A key to understanding the devices within the IoT is
that they are generally multifunctional, such that their form and function can be separated. In
other words, they are physical devices with a separate digital function.”).
35. Id.; Ferguson, supra note 14, at 818–23 (noting that the data collection feature is sometimes regarded as surveillance).
36. See supra note 2.
37. Id.
38. About scalability of the internet and related platforms, see Anisha Gupta et al., Scalability
in Internet of Things: Features, Techniques and Research Challenges, 13 INT’L J. COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RES. 1617, 1618 (2017). (discussing the scalability of IoT); Annemarie
Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 698 (2011)
(discussing scalability of peer-to-peer platforms).
39. See Poudel, supra note 19, at 1003–08; OECD DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH. & INNOVATION, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: SEIZING THE BENEFITS AND ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES 9
(2016) (discussing the scalability of IoT’s and its correlated potential as facilitating innovative
technologies); On cooperation between smart-devices, see infra notes 61–63.
40. See supra note 7; see infra the text accompanying notes 61–63 for concrete examples.
41. Recently, Crootof discussed this feature extensively, calling it “remote interference.” See
Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583, 600 (2019).
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physical actions executed by the device.42 Such remote operation can
be pre-programmed, making the smart-device act in a specific manner
given a specific situation.43 In turn, this means that operators can either activate the smart-devices in real-time or set instructions for the
device to perform when certain conditions are met.44
Remote operability, the ability to remotely instigate physical
changes to the smart-devices, is the single most important feature distinguishing smart-devices from traditional ones. To illustrate, imagine
attempting to lock a fridge’s door remotely: a traditional fridge would
require stepping into the user’s kitchen with a lock and a chain,
whereas smart-fridge operators can achieve the same outcome by simply sending a few lines of code via the Internet.
Remote operability of smart-devices also has legal implications: two
immediately come to mind. First, by allowing remote operability of
the device, this technology introduces new actors to the relationship
between the user and the device, namely the remote-operators. The
technology empowers these actors to execute physical actions regarding the smart-device that is located in the users’ homes, actions that
previously required sending a person to that location. Second, as will
be elaborated later remote operability also allows operators to modify
the physical functions of the smart-devices and thus influence specific
users’ behavior—driving users to perform or refrain from actions in
various ways.45
B. Opportunities and Challenges
The ability to remotely operate a smart-device is the technological
background that facilitates most of the smart-fridges’ attractive features.46 It allows users to gain information about the content of the
smart-fridge from far away—counting the number of yogurts left in
the fridge, verifying the expiration date of the milk, or quickly allowing a user to get recipes based on the products inside.47 It also
allows users to close a door that was mistakenly left open, customize
the temperatures of different parts, or lock the beer compartment
42. See id. at 595–96, 611; Ido Kilovaty, Freedom to Hack, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 472–73
(2019).
43. See generally Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 25 MICH.
TECH. L. REV. 59 (2018).
44. See infra Part II.B.
45. See infra the text accompanying notes 64, 72–75.
46. See supra note 2. On the advantages of smart devices generally, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle et
al., The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 802–09 (2019).
47. See supra note 2.

R
R
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before the children’s house party.48 The remote operability also allows
other operators to monitor and notify about problems with the smartfridge’s features (for instance, that the filter needs to be replaced).49
In addition, it allows operators to collect information and use it in
order to refine the operation of the device and its related services, like
optimizing energy consumption, creating a customized shopping list,
or monitoring the freshness of products.50
While those features seem promising, remote operability of smartdevices is not inherently desirable. It is a tool in the hands of operators. It allows them to overcome space and time barriers to operate
smart-devices’ functions, as well as to mediate the relationships between smart-devices and users.51 Setting aside possible software errors
or malicious hackings, even the powers that “friendly”52 operators
hold may be used in unexpectedly harmful ways. As such, remote
operability of smart-devices can be put to more or less socially desirable uses.53
To illustrate, consider operators’ ability to remotely lock the smartfridges’ doors or some of its compartments to limit users’ access. This
feature can be used to prevent unwelcome guests from using the
smart-fridge (or parts of it). For instance, consider shared workspaces
or apartments in which multiple users use the same smart-fridge, but
only specific users should be given access to some of its parts. This
remote limitation operates similarly to a vending machine’s limiting
access only to customers that pay.
But operators can also limit users’ access to the smart-fridge for
more objectionable reasons. For one, operators could limit user’s con48. These features are already available on some smart-fridges, for example, see the “Family
Hub Fridge” by Samsung. SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/home-appliances/refrigerators/4-door-french-door/28-cu--ft--4-door-french-door-refrigerator-with-21-5--connected-touch
screen-family-hub--in-tuscan-stainless-steel-rf28r7551dt-aa/ (last visited July 11, 2021).
49. This service is celebrated by some smart-fridge producers, see Proactive Customer Care,
LG, https://www.lg.com/us/discover/thinq/proactive-customer-support (last visited July 11, 2021)
(This feature, operated by the seller allows users to “[g]et automatic diagnostic checks of newly
installed appliances . . . [r]eceive alerts about possible maintenance issues before they even occur
and get guidance on how to correct the issue for maximum efficiency and cost-savings . . . [and]
[e]njoy detailed reports about appliance performance, notification history and current status.).
50. See supra note 2.
51. In that sense, smart-devices are not very different from other communication technologies, see Allen S. Hammond, Reflections on the Myth of Icarus in the Age of Information, 19
SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 407, 415 (2003) (“Not only do we use our tools to
mediate our relationship with the world, we use them to mediate our relationship with one another. This reliance on mediation is particularly evident in our use of communications
technology.”).
52. See supra note 26; see supra the text accompanying notes 149–50.
53. See infra note 220 and the accompanying text.
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sumption based on any random criteria. Imagine the embarrassment
when your guest, who already had two beers, approaches your kitchen
in the middle of the game, reaching for the beer compartment only to
be berated by the remote-operator for excessive drinking. Similarly,
smart-fridge operators might limit underaged or unrecognized users
from accessing the medicine compartment, thereby, for instance, limiting the babysitter from delivering medication to children they supervise. Even worse, more aggressive operators may use the smartdevices’ limiting abilities to intentionally constrain other users—some
might limit their spouse’s ice cream consumption, while others might
require ad-hoc approval for any treat, alcoholic beverage, or even essential dinner ingredients.54
The challenges posed by the remote operability of smart-devices are
exacerbated by the kind of potential harm they impose. Since smartdevices operate digital functions that have physical consequences,
they can also bring about physical harm.55 The physical presence of
these devices, especially combined with the vital functions that they
ordinarily fulfill in our lives (e.g., nutrition or medicine in the case of
smart-fridges, transportation in the case of smart-cars, etc.) translates
misusing them to potential considerable physical harm.56 So, while the
problem of operators limiting users is not unique to smart-devices, its
physical presence makes it particularly troubling. To illustrate, compare the harm of having one’s running playlist deleted by a remoteoperator as they are about to start a jog, to having a remote-operator
limit access to the smart-fridge when one’s blood sugar is low. Arguably, both hinder valued interests and can give rise to legal claims from
the user against the operator, but the possible outcomes of the latter,
namely the expected physical harm, make it more pressing.
These challenges of remote operability are broad and persistent.
They cannot be brushed aside as merely false identification issues, to
be remedied as technology hones.57 That is mainly because these challenges arise especially when the identification of smart-devices works
well, as the examples in previous paragraphs indicate. Moreover,
these issues arise in a wide array of smart-devices, including smartcars that enable remote operation of various aspects of car usage, such
as limiting the speed for specific drivers for various reasons such as
54. See infra Part III.A.4–5.
55. See, e.g., Crootof, supra note 41, at 587–88.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Patrick Nelson, How IoT devices can identify the people who use them, NETWORK
WORLD (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:31 AM), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2984805/how-iot-devices-can-identify-the-people-who-use-them.html; see generally Samera Batool et al., Identification of Remote IoT Users Using Sensor Data Analytics, in FOOD TOURISM IN ASIA 328–37 (2020).
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age or gender;58 or smart-modems that allow operators to remotely
block Internet access from specific users, to specific websites, or at
specific times, empowering operators with de-facto censorship abilities and correlating concerns.59
Furthermore, these challenges will only exacerbate as the scalability
of IoT kicks in. As explained, no smart-device stands alone.60 The operation of one smart-device regarding a specific user can be complemented by other smart-devices to impose more restrictive
limitations.61 For instance, a smart-toilet62 could send the smart-fridge
information about urine samples of the different users in the house,
modifying the use of the smart-fridge accordingly.63 More concretely,
upon indication from the smart-toilet that Hanna is pregnant, the
smart-fridge operators can impose limitations on Hanna, stopping her
from consuming refrigerated alcohol or reaching for the leftover sushi,
all before she even decides to take the pregnancy test.
The examples of misusing smart-fridges’ remote operability surveyed above showcase operators’ ability to limit users or at least modify users’ possible enjoyment from smart-devices or some of their
parts. Armed with the capability to operate the device in ways that
only users with physical access could before, those operators complicate the relationships between the user and the smart device. Simply
put, smart-device operators’ suddenly gain power over the users.64

58. See, e.g., European Commission Press Release, Road safety: Commission welcomes agreement on new EU rules to help save lives (Mar. 26, 2019).
59. AT&T recently started promoting parental control of smart-modems, which allow administrators to create users, block internet access, and schedule time restrictions for specific users,
see Use parental controls with Smart Home Manager, AT&T, https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/u-verse-high-speed-internet/KM1336815?gsi=7zteup (last visited July 11, 2021).
60. See supra notes 38–39.
61. Realistically, this concern would likely be materialized only by operators that have power
over multiple smart-devices regarding the same person, those that operate all the smart-home
devices, or sellers that sell multiple smart-devices. See infra Part IV.A.
62. See Bernard Marr, Artificial Intelligence In Your Toilet. Yes, Really!, FORBES (May 20,
2019, 12:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2019/05/20/artificially-intelligent-toilets-yes-they-are-here/#46bf4175626d; Kate Baggaley, Here’s how smart toilets of the future could
protect your health, NBC (Jan. 23, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/heres-how-smart-toilets-future-could-protect-your-health-ncna961656.
63. See supra notes 34–39.
64. See Crootof, supra note 41, at 600–10; SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 293–99
(2019). See Gal, supra note 43, at 76–93 (discussing some of the autonomy deficits caused by
algorithmic decision-making); Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 18–19
(2018) (discussing how operators’ nudging might change users’ behavior).
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* * *
This Part presented the emerging technology of smart-devices and
underscored one crucial aspect: the remote operability of the devices’
physical functions. This remote operability introduces additional actors to the relationship between the user and the device, namely the
remote-operators, and allows those actors to limit users in ways that
were until recently only imaginable. The rest of this Article will focus
on a particular aspect of remote operation of smart-devices—operators’ application of personalized policies on specific users.65 As we
shall see, this important phenomenon takes a unique form within the
realm of smart-devices. It allows various operators to limit specific
users in order to drive them to perform or refrain from performing
specific actions. It thus raises a myriad of interesting legal queries that
have not yet been discussed in legal scholarship about the regulation
of smart-devices and their operators.66
II.

PERSONALIZATION – SPECIFIC CONSTRAINTS
USERS

ON

SPECIFIC

This Part will analyze the concept of personalization in the context
of smart-devices’ operation. It will define the concept of personalization, explain the technicalities of how operators personalize smart-devices, and explore the application of different personalized constraints
using smart-devices.
A. Personalization Smart Devices
Earlier, I explained that remote operability of smart-devices empowers operators to control the devices’ monitoring functions as well
as to alter its physical functions.67 As hinted, this allows operators to
influence users by customizing the operation of the device.
Customization of smart-devices’ operation often takes one of two
forms: personalization or general optimization.68 General optimization of the smart-devices refers to operating the digital functions of
the smart-fridge for the benefit of all users indiscriminately, for instance, by enhancing energy efficiency.69 Conversely, personalization
refers to operating smart-devices differently per user, according to the
65. See infra Part II.
66. See infra Part III–IV.
67. See supra the text accompanying notes 27–33; see supra Part I.B.
68. Cf. Sofia Grafanaki, Drowning In Big Data: Abundance Of Choice, Scarcity Of Attention
And The Personalization Trap, A Case For Regulation, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (2017).
69. Id.
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attributes and characteristics of a specific user.70 Optimization is a
process used by many devices, traditional and smart alike, while personalization is an innovative feature of smart-devices.71
In the smart-devices framework, I define personalization as the limitations, adaptations, or modifications that operators of smart-devices
apply, intended to facilitate, limit, or prompt a specific user to act in a
specific way, based on information gathered on that specific user.72
In other words, operators distinguish between different users and
adapt the operation of the different functions of the smart-device for
that specific user, limiting some options and allowing others, in order
to reach a particular desired outcome.73 This point is worth reiterating: by personalizing, operators remotely bring about physical changes
to smart-devices in order to drive users to alter their behavior; to make
users perform or refrain from performing physical actions that they
would not have taken otherwise.74 Scholars already noticed that forprofit companies might attempt to exploit these powers to gain eco70. Id.
71. As we shall see later, personalization also requires information that allows identifying the
users, which traditional devices lack, see infra, notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
72. The definition is mine, but related ideas can be found in other literature. Cf. the notion of
personalization as was discussed in the legal health scholarship: Mollie Roth, The Warfarin Revised Package Insert: Is the Information in the Label “Too Thin”?, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 279, 286–87 (2009) (“ ‘[P]ersonalized medicine’ is an umbrella term encompassing the idea
that now information about a specific patient’s genotype or gene expression profile may be used
to even more closely tailor medical care to an individual’s needs. Such information can be used
to help stratify disease status, select between different medications, and tailor their dosage or
provide a specific therapy for an individual’s specific disease.”); W. Nicholson Price II, BlackBox Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 425–30 (2015) (“Although there are many slightly
varying definitions of personalized medicine, the heart of it is this: All patients are different, and
treatment can and should be tailored to the individual patient to the extent possible.”). Others
use two different phrases to explain what I regard as the process of personalization: one is personalization, referring to understanding the specific desires of some individual; another is customization, referring to acting to fulfill these specific desires. See, e.g., Phil Davis, What is the
Difference Between Personalization and Customization?, TOWERDATA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
www.towerdata.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-personalization-and-customization.
73. Roth, supra note 72, at 286–87; Davis, supra note 72.
74. ZUBOFF, supra note 64, at 293–99. She referred to this call to action instigated by the
operation of the smart-device, “actuation.” See also Steve Woolgar, Configuring the user: the case
of usability trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 58, 68–69 (John Law ed., 1991) (discussing how the context of technology limits users);
Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 DæDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS
& SCIS. 18, 23 (2016); JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 71 (2019) (explaining that the data driven companies
“are designed to offer powerful, high-speed techniques for matching populations with particular
strategies calibrated for surplus extraction. The techniques operate on ‘raw’ personal data to
produce ‘refined’ data doubles and use the data doubles to generate preemptive nudges that,
when well executed, operate as self-fulfilling prophecies, eliciting the patterns of behavior, content consumption, and content sharing already judged most likely to occur”).
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nomic surpluses.75 However, those are not the only actors nor the only
concerning motives that the personalization of smart-devices invokes.
Arguing that personalization limits users or prompts them towards
specific outcomes does not imply it is undesirable.76 Indeed, tailoring
the use of products and services for specific needs of specific users is
often celebrated as a great boon to users.77 The view that personalization policies are objectionable simply because they limit users wrongly
assumes that without such personalization users would be “free” to
use the functions that the smart-device facilitates and therefore would
be better off.78 However, the reality is more complicated.79 Freedom
to access all available functions does not necessarily translate to easier
or better user experience, especially when there is an abundance of
possibilities and the user is humanely limited.80 Many of the services
and devices we use would not have been appealing had the operators
not personalized use of them for us.81 To see this, just imagine what
searching for videos on YouTube would have been like had its operators not personalized the content for you.82
Similar arguments supporting personalization could be applied to
smart-fridges: personalization of ordering milk frees users from reviewing all the alternatives for each purchase, and personalizing the
fridge’s arrangement could make the products for the next meal more
accessible. For now, we can set aside the normative arguments for or
against personalization.83 My claim here is descriptive, namely that
personalization is a form of limitation initiated by operators and
aimed at specific users.
75. ZUBOFF, supra note 64, 293–328; Crootof, supra note 41, at 593–605.
76. Cf. infra note 220.
77. Julien Boudet et al., The future of personalization—and how to get ready for it, MCKINSEY
& CO. (June 18, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/ourinsights/the-future-of-personalization-and-how-to-get-ready-for-it#.
78. On the freedom argument and its problems, see, e.g., Grafanaki, supra note 68, at 26.
79. Id.
80. See Gal, supra note 43, at 84–87 (explaining the psychological burdens of choices and how
algorithms may assist).
81. Woolgar, supra note 74, at 75 (suggesting that the technology’s design has to predicts what
the user will want to do, which makes its designers “define[ ] users’ future requirement”). This
point is also valid in information moderation, see, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 562–63 (2018) (arguing that the abundance of information makes
the challenge of mediating proper information more pressing than the challenge of supporting
creation of content).
82. On YouTube’s personalization and video suggestions, see YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/1456096?hl=EN&msgid=1532143 (last visited July 11, 2021).;
see also Grafanaki, supra note 68, at 26–37.
83. See infra Part III.C.6–7. Arguably, empowering operators to allow users to perform specific actions or to limit them from performing others are two faces of the same coin—both are an
exertion of power on the user.
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Note, with the necessary modifications, the aforementioned definition of personalization can apply to numerous instances of personalization by various operators—including operators of smart-devices, of
software, of physical spaces, etc.84 This Article only discusses personalization of smart-devices, which makes for a particularly interesting case because it combines the personalization of code and the
personalization of physical space.85
B. How to Personalize
Moving on to the technicalities: how do operators personalize? The
first step is identifying the individual that is about to use the smartdevice.86 To do so, smart-devices’ operators often apply various
sources of data to create specific profiles for each individual that interacts with the device.87 At this stage, the only identification necessary is
one that allows operators to distinguish between the different users of
the smart-device.88 This distinction does not have to refer to any external identification methods, such as name, social security number, or
social media account.89 Rather, the point is simply to create a virtual
representations of an individual user that can be distinguished from
other users.90
Once users are identified, the operators will determine whether the
user fits some set criteria.91 These criteria can be general and predetermined, such as age, gender, or weight; or specific and ad-hoc, such
as the number of beers or chocolate bars that this user had in the last
hour.92 Once the operators identified that the user fits a criterion, they
84. See infra Part II.B–D.
85. See infra Part II.C.
86. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
87. The GDPR coined the term profiling for this part of the personalization process: “ ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person . . .” see 2016 O.J. (L 679)
119.
88. E.g., user 1, user 2 . . . user n.
89. Daniel H. Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web Through Portable Identity, Cross-Web Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
176, 206 (2010) (discussing signing in to different web services using specific users); see also Use
your Google Account to sign in to other apps or services, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
accounts/answer/112802?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=EN (last visited July 11, 2021).
90. Cf. COHEN, supra note 74, at 67 (explaining the notion of “data doubles,” virtual representations of individuals based on data sets about those particular individuals. Data doubles are
designed to enable operators to construct and manage the actions of that individual).
91. Cf. Davis, supra note 72.
92. Other personalization criteria discussed in the literature include those based on capacity,
resources, skills, or risk, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 636–55 (2016).
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would apply the limitations set for this specific criterion.93 Setting the
criteria and determining whether a user fits some criterion is based on
data about the user, thus, collecting more information about users is
helpful for better personalization.94 More available information facilitates the creation and application of more criteria, which could be applied more specifically to smaller and more nuanced groups of users,
thus creating higher resolution customization.95 Theoretically, however, basic personalization can be achieved with very little information about the user, namely, information that allows distinguishing
one user from another.
To illustrate, a smart-fridge can use its sensors to identify that the
user that is about to approach is “User 1,” part of the criterion “User
1 and User 2,” and operate the set limitation of locking the beer compartment. Alternatively, the smart-fridge may identify that Joe is approaching the smart-fridge, retrieve that Joe’s Facebook profile
indicates that he is fifteen years old and thus fit the criteria of being
underage, and accordingly operate the limitation of locking the beer
compartment. Both cases involve personalization, the situations differ
by the volume of information and thus sophistication and details-resolution applied by the operator.
C. Modes of Personalization
Lawrence Lessig famously introduced four sources of constraints or
regulations that can be imposed to affect behavior: laws, norms, architecture (physical and code), and market.96 This construct has interesting implications for personalization of smart-devices. Namely,
personalization of smart-devices relies on personalization of code and
physical architecture,97 and can be used to further develop law and
market constraints.
1. Physical & Code Architecture
Computer code imposes constraints on users by defining what the
user can and cannot do at different interactions with the relevant
code.98 James Grimmelman neatly captured this idea, noting that by
93. Grafanaki, supra note 68, at 20–22; see infra note 205.
94. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
96. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121–25 (2006). For analysis and criticism of this
view, see James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1723 (2005).
97. See infra Part I.A.1.
98. LESSIG, supra note 96, at 124–25; supra Part I.A. For reservations to seeing code as architecture see, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 96, at 1721–22 (criticizing Lessig and suggesting that
software is its own form of regulation).
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providing a limited set of possible actions, codes exclude every action
that is not in the set.99 Think about a desktop computer shared by
several family members. If each family member has their own user
profile, then a mother may have access to programs and files that her
daughter does not have access to and vice versa. Similarly, on the Internet, when logging in to Facebook, the information and options that
are presented on one person’s screen (e.g., the content of private
groups, chats, or the newsfeed) are probably different than yours.
While some might see content about design and architecture, others
might never be aware that those exist on Facebook and only see content about politics and law.100 Hence, code is a mode of regulation
that can be used to impose personalized constraints.101 Since computer codes can be created and modified by simply rewriting lines of
code, it is a relatively easy and dynamic form of constraint.
Using code to facilitate particular services to particular users—be it
a desktop’s operating system, social media websites, or any other platform—is personalization via code. It allows only certain users to perform specific actions or see specific content, while conversely limiting
others from accessing such content.102 As mentioned, these can be
used for more or less praiseworthy endeavors.103 Examples of the former were mentioned in the previous paragraph; examples of the latter
include limitations imposed on TikTok and iPhone users in countries
surrounding China, barring them from seeing specific languages or
emojis that are available to other users.104
Lessig also held that physical architecture could impose physical
burdens to constrain users, one obvious example being a wall blocking
the way.105 Such physical burdens can also impose personalized con99. See Grimmelmann, supra note 96, at 1729.
100. See Grafanaki, supra note 68.
101. See supra Part II.B.
102. Supra notes 98–100.
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See Jay Peters & Nick Statt, Apple is hiding Taiwan’s flag emoji if you’re in Hong Kong
or Macau, THE VERGE (Oct. 7, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/7/20903613/
apple-hiding-taiwan-flag-emoji-hong-kong-macau-china (For users that buy Apple devices in
China, the Taiwanese flag is replaced by a missing character sign, while users in Hong-Kong can
see the Taiwanese flag if used by others, but their Emoji keyboard does not include this flag.
Thus, all these users are limited from using their devices in a specific according to the code used
in their specific case.); Casey Newton, It turns out there really is an American social network
censoring political speech, THE VERGE (Sept. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/9/26/20883993/tiktok-censorship-china-bytedance-politics (publishing that TikTok instructs
its moderators to censor videos “that mention Tiananmen Square, Tibetan independence, or the
banned religious group Falun Gong, according to leaked documents detailing the site’s moderation guidelines”).
105. LESSIG, supra note 96, at 124.
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straints. Think of parents that limit their children from accessing the
cookie jar by placing obstacles aimed at children. Parents may place it
in a high cabinet or use a lock that only adults know how to open. This
is the physical personalization of the cookie jar—the operators (parents) use the physical space to limit specific users (children) from accessing certain functions (getting the cookie jar and eating the
cookies). Like personalization by code, personalization by physical architecture limits users’ actions within the relevant space—physical or
cyber. Compared to the personalization of code, personalization of
physical space may be more salient and thus normatively more troubling given the physical nature of the limitation.106
These two modes of regulation are crucial for smart-devices. I explained that the digitization of smart-fridges’ functions empowers remote operability of those functions.107 Remote-operability allows
operators to use a code to activate the digitized functions in a specific
way that modifies the physical architecture of the device. In the case
of smart-devices, the personalization of code facilitates the personalization of space.
For example, personalization of smart-fridges can involve operators
using code to: allow only specific users to open the beer compartment,
prohibit specific users from opening the doors after a specific time, or
reorganize the content of the fridge to make some products more accessible or visible for specific users. Similarly, smart-cars can be personalized, namely by using code to apply speed limits on specific users
and not on others. In a similar vein, smart-modems (and indeed smartphones) can apply code to limit specific users from accessing specific
applications or websites during specific times, smart-doors can lock
certain users inside or outside specific rooms, and the list goes on.108
Indeed, the operation of smart-devices essentially uses code architecture to modify physical architecture. This combination allows operators to enjoy the dynamic advantages of personalization by code with
the salient advantages of personalization by physical space. Those advantages grant operators of smart-devices unprecedented power to
prompt users to do or refrain from doing certain actions.109 This is the
primary and most essential aspect of smart-devices’ personalization,
which can be utilized by various operators and by other forms of
constraints.110
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra note 55–56, 73–74 and accompanying text.
Supra the text accompanying note 41–45.
See supra the text accompanying notes 58-62.
See id.; see supra the text accompanying notes 70–72.
See infra Part II.C.2–3, III.A.
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2. Smart-Devices and Personalization of Law
Laws can be personalized.111 Personalized law can be seen as “a
personalized command that is based on information about this actor’s
specific characteristics.”112 When laws are personalized, the limitations that they impose vary according to the specific attributes and
circumstances of the individual, thereby limiting one person but not
another in cases that would otherwise be treated indiscriminately. Instances of personalized law include adapting reasonability standards
in negligence to the characteristics of the specific actor,113 using personalized default rules based on specific characteristics in contracts,114
personalizing taxes based on income or other measures,115 personalizing disclosures for the knowledge and expertise of the specific actors,116 etc.117 Arguably, norms may also be personalized to some
extent, as exemplified by gender-based personalization of dress codes.
The claim that law can, and often should, be personalized is not
innovative in any way. Indeed, the idea that the law should be tailored
to better fit the relevant context to which it applies is obvious and has
been around as long as the idea of law itself. Indeed, every law has
some contextual parameters. The question is how specific—or how
finely tailored—those parameters will be.”118 More exciting is the possibility of combining the personalization of law and personalization of
smart-devices, as it can affect both the kind of laws enacted and their
application.119
Consider how smart-devices can personalize the application of law.
This Article previously argued that personalization includes operating
the functions of smart-devices to drive users to do or refrain from do111. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (discussing the
adoption of personalized default rules for specific legal contexts).
112. Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 92, at 629; Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A
Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 335 (2019).
113. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 92; Casey & Niblett, supra note 112, at 341–44.
114. Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 (2019).
115. John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals
in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095,
2103 (2000).
116. Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer
Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309, 312 (2019).
117. Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell, Personalizing Precommitment, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 434 (2019); Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the
Personalization of Copyright Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019).
118. Casey & Niblett, supra note 112, at 333.
119. Id. at 339–43.
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ing something.120 One instance of personalization can therefore be
driving users to obey the law. Examples include smart-fridges applying laws that require consumers to be warned about harmful ingredients in a product, smart-cars limiting the speed limit based on the
speed limit on the specific road, or a smart-door locking and stopping
burglars from running away.121 As we shall see later, personalization
methods vary in their stringency, and the more stringent the method
the more likely it is to drive the user to do or refrain from doing some
action.122 At its extreme, personalization of smart-devices can apply
laws to the degree of absolute coercion: blocking any possibility for
breaking the law—enforcement of speed limits by smart-cars being a
primary example.123
A particularly interesting implication of using personalization of
smart-devices to drive individuals to obey the law, is that smart-devices can potentially extend law’s practical reach to spaces, actions, or
details that were not previously feasible. In this sense, it resembles
other technologies that empower more pervasive, consistent, and potentially absolute application of law within their realm of application.124 The ability to employ personalization of smart-devices for
more comprehensive application of law raises various normative questions: should the state be permitted to use this technology to enforce
its law wherever and whenever it can? Should it be encouraged to?
Answering these normative questions raises familiar issues about selective enforcement of laws that cannot be fully addressed here.125
The main point here is that the technological ability to personalize the
use of smart-devices influences the practical ability to enforce law.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. Admittedly, these examples might require additional information as explained above, see
supra, notes 56–57.
122. See infra Part III.A.2.
123. See, e.g., Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 795, 802–04 (2013) (discussing the use of IoT technology to make certain actions impossible, and distinguishing between allowing individuals to act in undesired ways and punishing them
afterwards, and creating a system that limits individuals’ ability to do the undesirable act); MyungSan Jun, Blockchain government - a next form of infrastructure for the twenty-first century, 4
J. OPEN INNOVATION: TECH., MKT., & COMPLEXITY 1, 5, 9 (2018) (discussing the notion of
blockchain-based “absolute laws” that compel “absolute coercion,” meaning laws that the user
cannot break).
124. Jun, supra note 123. For information on the way social media technologies facilitates
better application of speech regulation, see, e.g., HCJ 7846/19 Adalla v. Cyber Unit State Att’ys
Off. (2021) (Isr.).
125. See, e.g., John Kleinig, Selective Enforcement and the Rule of Law, 29 J. SOC. PHILO. 117
(1998); Nicola Persico, Rational Choice Foundations of Equal Protection in Selective Enforcement: Theory and Evidence, U. PA. INST. FOR L. & ECON. (Aug. 2, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921612.
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Thereby, personalization of smart-devices invites us to revisit and
question our normative stance on law enforcement and its limits.
Furthermore, by expanding the potential practical reach of law’s application, personalization of smart-devices can ex ante influence the
content of law. As smart-devices empower the application of law on
more nuanced situations and in previously unregulated (or unregulatable) actions and spaces, they pave the way for the state to legalize
and regulate situations, actions and spaces. For instance, the ability to
identify the characteristics of the user approaching the smart-fridge
can support more nuanced alcohol consumption regulation, such as
determining the limit on consumption of alcoholic goods based on the
amount of alcohol they consumed recently (e.g., by calculating the alcohol volume in the different products). It can also support more direct regulation of alcohol-consumption in one’s private homes. In a
similar vein, smart-cars can support a more nuanced speed limit regulations, allowing more experienced drivers to drive faster and imposing more restricting limitations on inexperienced drivers. It can also
facilitate more frequent changes to the speed limit, for instance when
the weather conditions change, overcoming the stringency of existing
rules.
Put simply, the ability to personalize the application of law using
smart-devices might serve as a catalyst for creating more nuanced personalized law or to regulate activities and spaces that were not previously regulated. In turn, this can change the way we think about legal
regulations in several aspects.126
First, personalized laws based on smart-devices rely on a more detailed characterization of the regulated actor and the specific circumstances. As such, they can be more nuanced and better suited for the
desired outcomes of the law, as the laws discussed in the previous paragraph exemplify, and thereby allow at least some users more leniency
and less coercion.127
Second, shifting the burden of enforcement onto smart-devices that
can apply the law in a more robust and personalized way can influence
the distinction between rules and standards. For instance, the changing speed limit example noted above can replace standards like “driving according to the road conditions.” As such, personalized laws
based on smart-devices might undermine the use of legal standards
that rely on ex-post human interpretation in favor of an abundance of
126. See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 112; Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The
Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401 (2017).
127. See supra the text accompanying note 123–25.
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clearer and more precise rules that regulate different scenarios and
are easier to enforce using smart-devices’ code.128
Third, relatedly, the distinction between conduct rules and decision
rules may not be necessary anymore:129 if the smart-devices would effectively prevent users from breaking the law, then users would not be
able to act according to the conduct rule, turning this into a distinction
without a difference. For instance, if smart-cars limit drivers from exceeding the speed limit on any specific road, then users are incapable
of exceeding it, as they usually would do on an open road.130
Fourth, if enforcement by smart-devices refrains users from acting
according to conduct rules over decision rules, then regulators do not
have to bear in mind the conduct rules and would be able to set less
restrictive rules to begin with, such as raising the speed limit.131
Fifth and finally, should the state decide to use personalization of
smart-devices to create or apply law onto previously under-regulated
activities, it might put significant pressure on the distinction between
private and public realms. This can be illustrated by the potential regulation of alcohol consumption within one’s home using one’s smartfridge.
3. Smart-Devices and Personalization of Markets
For the purposes of this paper, market limitations are constraints
that originate in market analyses and for market-based reasons.132 Private actors have incentives to apply various constraints, including personalization policies, in order to extract monetary surplus.133 Market
constraints can limit certain users from gaining certain products in
many ways. Consider two instances. First, setting different prices for
128. See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Prefatory Remarks, in HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 7 (M. Hildebrandt & J. Gaakeer eds., 2013) (“[T]he ambiguity
that provides law with its ?exibility, while challenging the need for legal certainty, derives from
the fact that law is language, requiring students of law to immerse themselves in the richness as
well as the boring precision of legal text.”). For a discussion about rules and standards, see
generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Forum: Rules v. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV 23 (2000); Casey & Niblett, supra note 112.
129. On decision rules and conduct rules, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
130. See European Commission Press Release, Road safety: Commission welcomes agreement on new EU rules to help save lives (Mar. 26, 2019); Rich, supra note 123, at 802.
131. I am grateful to Omer Y. Pelled for pointing this out.
132. See LESSIG, supra note 96, at 123–25.
133. See, e.g., Andrew Kasabian, Litigating in the 21st Century: Amending Challenges for
Cause in Light of Big Data, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 173, 190 (2015).
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different users based on their characteristics.134 Online retailers may
sell similar goods to different people for different prices—asking a
higher price from people that really need the product or from wealthier potential clients.135 Second, markets may apply personalized constraints by suggesting different products to different users; for
instance, suggesting blue shirts for parents that have sons and pink
shirts for parents that have daughters.136 In both cases, market personalization limits particular users (or at least significantly burdens
them) from buying particular products, either by the price tag attached to the product or by its availability.137
Market personalization can also use smart-devices to impose restrictions on users.138 Rebecca Crootof explained how private companies could use the remote operability of the devices to monitor and
limit users. She includes examples such as retailers remotely limiting
the use of smart-cars when the users break the terms of the contract:
falling behind on payments or driving beyond state bounds, landlords
locking the doors to tenants that violate leases, e-reader books disappearing from the device once the loan period is over, etc.139 Other
instances may include forcing users to update software on the device;
otherwise, the device’s capacity will be diminished.140 Market personalization of smart-devices can also be used to promote specific
products. Imagine an Amazon-operated smart-fridge, paid to favor
Heinz ketchup over the competitors. The smart-fridge can be set to
134. See generally Ramsi A. Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, 51 CONN. L.
REV. 311, 321–26 (2019).
135. See, e.g., Brian Wallheimer, Are you ready for personalized pricing?, CHI. BOOTH REV.
(Feb. 26, 2018), http://review.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/2018/article/are-you-ready-personalized-pricing; Rafi Mohammed, How Retailers Use Personalized Prices to Test What You’re Willing to Pay, HARV BUS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/how-retailers-usepersonalized-prices-to-test-what-youre-willing-to-pay.
136. Kenneth A. Jacobsen, Rolling Back the “Pink Tax”: Dim Prospects for Eliminating Gender-Based Price Discrimination in the Sale of Consumer Goods and Services, 54 CAL. W. L. REV.
241, 249 (2018).
137. Admittedly, in a free market system this limitation is seldom as strict as architecture or
law because the users may shop the same products in by other merchants. This does not mean
that users are not limited, but that they can more easily overcome the limitation.
138. Market personalization also include collecting information about the different users. See,
e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 64, at 293–328; Crootof, supra note 41, at 596–99. However, those do
not directly pose physical restrictions on users, and therefore are beyond the scope of this
argument.
139. Crootof, supra note 41, at 598–606.
140. To see the problems with such distinction, note the case of Sonos speakers, in which the
company announced it will stop operating some devices, rendering them useless to the users
even as “traditional” speakers. Lauren Goode, Sonos Will Soon End Software Support for Its
Older Speakers, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/older-sonosspeakers-will-stop-receiving-updates/.
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only order this specific brand of ketchup (as a default or limitation), to
rearrange itself to make that product more visible, to make annoying
sounds when a competing brand is put in the smart-fridge, or, even
more pervasively, refuse to cool any compartment containing competing products.141
*

*

*

There are three main takeaways from this Part. First, analytically,
personalization involves an imposition of specific limitations on specific users by operators, aimed at prompting users to do something.
Second, practically, personalization of smart-devices brings to the
forefront new and more invasive possibilities for operators to limit
users and drive them to act. Third, this ability to personalize the use of
smart-devices ex ante invites different actors to impose more nuanced
limitations on users, which in turn can change the nature of legal and
market regulation.
The endless possibilities of personalization using smart-devices,
some more beneficial and some more harmful, makes attempts to devise regulatory approaches to specific personalization policies extremely difficult.142 The next chapter will explore and tease out
normative intuitions and theoretical concerns regarding regulating the
personalization of smart-devices—focusing on the operators of the devices and the justifications to allow them to impose personalization
policies on users.
III. PERSONALIZATION

BY

ORDINARY OPERATORS

This Article previously argued that by facilitating remote operability, smart-devices invite more actors into the relationship between
the user and the device, namely operators.143 It also discussed a
unique power that those operators have when using the device—the
ability to personalize the operation of the device to drive particular
users to particular outcomes.144 This Part advances a legal analysis of
personalization by smart-devices. It starts by identifying the legal actors pulling the strings of smart-devices and categorizing three main
141. While these could seem as hypothetical possibilities, it is important to realize that the
technology as well as the distribution of legal powers can support such personalization for smartfridges that are in the market today.
142. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 105 (2019); Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in
the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENVER U. L. REV. 87, 133–43 (2018).
143. See supra Part I.
144. See supra Part II.
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methods of constraints that they may apply.145 Then, it turns to analyze the desirability of such personalization policies, first adopting the
users’ perspective and assessing how personalization policies harm
their freedoms,146 and then discussing the distribution of legal and
physical powers that govern those personalization policies.147
Before we delve in, a quick qualification of scope. As explained,
smart-devices can theoretically connect to any server (computer) on
the Internet in order to receive commands and share the information
it collects.148 Since this Article focuses on servers that are legitimately
authorized to access or operate smart-devices, i.e., “friendly” servers,
interesting discussions about cybersecurity and the prevention of unauthorized or malicious operation of the smart-devices will not be
addressed.149
A. Meet the Ordinary Operators
1. Three Ordinary Operators
To advance a legal analysis of the personalization of smart-devices,
it is crucial to point out the legal actors that operate the digital functions of the smart-device.150 These actors are (server) operators, defined here as the legal entity that controls a server that sends commands
to the smart-devices or retrieves information from it.151 Remember that
operators may operate the device in real-time or in advance.152
Admittedly, since decision-making about smart-device operations is
often initiated by algorithms, which were often themselves partly or
entirely created by other algorithms, the identification of the legal entity that best fits the definition of operator can be difficult.153 This
145. See infra Part III.A.
146. See infra Part III.B.
147. See infra Part III.C.
148. See supra notes 24, 26.
149. For discussions about cybersecurity concerns that arise from smart-devices, see, e.g., Sara
Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Dangers, and Legal
Responses, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 162–63 (2018); Mauricio Paez & Kerianne Tobitsch,
The Industrial Internet of Things: Risks, Liabilities, and Emerging Legal Issues, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 217, 220–21 (2018); Liz Allison, You Can’t Hack This: The Regulatory Future of Cybersecurity in Automobiles, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 15, 16 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Securing the Internet of Healthcare, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405, 415–16 (2018). For recent
regulatory approaches to cyber-security threats posed by smart-devices see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.91.04 (West 2018); 2019 O.J. (L 151) 881.
150. FISCHER, supra note 17, at 3.
151. Cf. GRIMMELMANN, supra note 26, at 32.
152. See supra text following note 38.
153. For discussion about the control and effective oversight of AI decision-making, see, e.g.,
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399
(2017); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
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challenge need not be sorted out here. For our analysis, suffice to assume that there exists an identifiable legal entity that is the operator,
be it the humans that send commands and retrieve information directly or other legal entities that created (or are otherwise legally responsible for) an algorithm that “independently” performs these
tasks.
I distinguish between three kinds of ordinary operators. The first
kind of operators that can impose limitations on users are the users
themselves. Here, a user is anyone that physically uses the smart-device, and is exposed to and affected by the operations of its functions.
Users can operate the smart-devices in two ways: directly, using hardware embedded in the smart-device itself such as a touch-screen,
voice-activation system, or a steering wheel; or remotely, through a
designated software installed in users’ smartphones or personal computers. Crucially, users can operate the smart-device in ways that affect themselves or other users. I refer to these alternatives respectively
as self-imposed operation and inter-user operation.154
The second kind of limiting operators are private companies, operating the smart-devices remotely for business reasons. These could include both the company that manufactured or initially sold the smartfridge to the users, its authorized technicians,155 or private companies
that gained access to the devices via contractual agreements.156 Limitations posed by those private companies are usually market
limitations.157
The third kind of operator is the state. It is technologically possible
for state officials to operate smart-devices’ servers directly by acquiring access to the server, collecting relevant information, hiring coders
to operate it, and sending commands directly to the devices.158 However, it seems more likely that the state would use its powers to regulate the use of the smart-fridge, particularly, by requiring other actors
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1023 (2017).
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. Cf. the definition of “manufacturer” in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.05 (West 2018).
156. See, e.g., an Alexa embedded smart-fridge. LG, https://www.lg.com/us/refrigerators/lgLNXS30996D-door-in-door#none (last visited July 11, 2021).
157. See supra Part II.C.3; LESSIG, supra note 96, at 123–25 (explaining that constraints on
users that originate in market-based reasons are market constraints).
158. On the possibility of mass use of IoT by the state to collect information and achieve
policy goals, see, e.g., Akemi Takeoka Chat?eld & Christopher G. Reddick, A framework for
Internet of Things-enabled smart government: A case of IoT cybersecurity policies and use cases in
U.S. federal government, 36 GOV’T INFO. Q. 346 (2018); Jean Pierre Maissin et al., How will IoT
improve public sector services?, in INSIDE (2015); John G. Browning & Lisa Angelo, Alexa, Testify: New sources of evidence from the internet of things, 82 TEX. BAR J. 506 (2019).
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to operate the smart-fridge in the ways the state sees fit.159 As explained, the state can require operators to limit specific users from
making specific actions, personalize rules that would limit different
users in various situations, or determine a recommendation for specific users and require other operators to implement it.160
2. Three Methods of Constraint
Each of the ordinary operators can use various methods of constraint to impose personalized limitations on users of smart-devices,
some more stringent than others.161 To simplify, I distinguish between
three methods: notice (easy nudge), nudge, and prevention.162
The most lenient of the three is notice, that is, providing the user
information about the action that they are about to pursue.163 In our
context, this may include providing information about the nutritional
value of the product they are about to consume, about recommended
usage, about past use, etc.164 The most stringent limitation is prevention, which refers to the maximal limitation the smart-device can impose on a user’s ability to perform some action.165 For instance,
prevention by smart-fridges includes locking doors or specific compartments, not cooling a specific area, breaking products to prevent
use, or issuing bright lights and annoying sounds.166
The intermediate method of constraint is the nudge, the “liberal paternalism.” This approach aims to apply behavioral levers to regulate
the choice architecture of the users, incentivizing them to perform
some acts and refrain from others, while preserving their ability to
159. See supra Part II.C.2. For a related discussion about empowering private entities to personalize and enforce the law, see Andrew Verstein, Privatizing Personalized Law, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 551 (2019).
160. See supra Part I.A.2.
161. Cf. Daniel Susser et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 12–29 (2019) (discussing persuasion, coercion, and manipulation online).
162. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773 (2014) (arguing that
there are three main forms of regulation that ought to be regarded—code, notice, or nudge); cf.
ZUBOFF, supra note 64, at ch. 10 (distinguishing between: tuning, viz. nudging for commercial
interests; herding, viz. controlling user’s immediate context; and conditioning, viz educating
users to respond to a specific stimulus with a specific response).
163. Calo, supra note 162, at 787–89.
164. I realize that nudges come in many shapes and forms, and that often notices could be
seen as nudges. By notices here, I have in mind providing users the kind of information that
increases their navigability, not those that necessarily push them towards a specific outcome. On
navigability, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019).
165. I focus on common smart-devices that can be physically overcome by users by unplugging it, disconnecting it from the network or hacking it submission. Thus, absolute prevention
will not be discussed.
166. Less immediate prevention methods include shaming the user by informing another user
(or the state) about lack of compliance.
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choose to opt-out.167 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein define a nudge
as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives . . . intervention must be easy and
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level
counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.”168 Nudges vary in
stringency; sometimes they will seem indistinguishable from mere notices (e.g., calorie signs), and other times, they may be so stringent
that people almost always comply with them—making them seem
more like mandates.169 In the case of smart-fridges, nudges may include making specific products less accessible by requiring additional
passwords to reach them or by automatically reorganizing products in
a particular way that makes them less reachable. Nudges may also
make products less appealing, for instance by warming beer that
should be served cold or freezing ice cream beyond (immediately)
useable temperature.
B. Towards Legal Intervention I – Assessing the Harms to Users’
Freedom
It is difficult to accurately measure harms to users, both generally
and in instances of personalization by smart-devices.170 However, a
rough estimation of objectionability can be achieved by combining the
kind of operators imposing the personalization policy and the methods of constraints used in each setting. The following table presents
the intersection of the kinds of operators and methods of personalization articulated above. It suggests a simplified view of personalization
schemes that smart-devices enable, and thus invites an intuitive normative evaluation of those based on a tangible example.
The working example for this table is simple: a user approaches the
smart-fridge in order to get yogurt. The smart-fridge has a dairy compartment where yogurts are stored, and this compartment can be
locked or unlocked digitally by the operator. The device identifies the
167. Calo, supra note 162, at 783–87.
168. RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). Sunstein recently expanded this view, explaining that the
role of nudges is to overcome the problem of navigability, which prevents people from pursuing
their real goals and thus hinders individuals’ freedom, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 164.
169. See Lavi, supra note 64, at 8–11, 21–35, 79–85 (explaining the nudge approach and discussing different ways for online intermediaries to nudge the users, and discussing various stringencies of nudges); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1594, 1638 (2014) (criticizing the nudge approach and
arguing that because default rules suggested by it are so “sticky,” they amount to mere
regulation).
170. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 142; Tschider, supra note 142; cf. Crootof, supra note 41.
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specific user and acknowledges that they belong to Category X (for
instance, youth, overweight, diabetic, lactose intolerant, or specific
user outlined by an operator). Then, the smart-fridge applies a personalization scheme that the operator initiated. The table showcases
the different operators (in the columns) using different methods (in
the rows). The first sentences in the boxes specify the pre-determined
limitation imposed by the respective operator, followed by the actions
taken by the smart-fridge or by other actors.
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Other-user
Private Company
limitation
initiated limitation initiated limitation

Notice

John: “I wish to
be informed if I
eat more than
five daily dairy
products.”
Smart-fridge:
“You had five
dairies today,
taking this will
exceed your daily
dairy limit.”

John: “Inform Elli
that it’s bad for
her to eat more
than two daily
dairy products.”
Smart-fridge:
“Elli, John says
that you should
not eat more than
two dairies per
day, and this is
your third.”

Private company:
“Suggest category
X users to eat dairy
products by brand
B.”
Smart-fridge:
“People like you
eat at least two
daily dairy
products; did you
know that brand B
has all your
vitamins?”

Nudge

John: “I wish to
limit my daily
dairy
consumption to
two.”
Smart-Fridge:
“You exceeded
your daily dairy
cap.”
- “To take dairy,
say the
password.”
or
- Rearranging
products to
hide dairy until
tomorrow.

John: “Nudge Elli
not to eat more
than two daily
dairy products.”
Smart-Fridge:
“Elli, you
exceeded your
daily dairy cap.”
- “To take dairy,
say the
password.”
or
- Rearranging
products to
hide dairy until
tomorrow.

Private company:
“Nudge category X
users to eat more
than two daily
dairy products by
brand B.”
Smart-Fridge:
“You have not
completed your
suggested daily
dairy goal.”
- “Eat one type B
dairy to get
additional
points.”
or
- Rearranging
products to
show brand B
dairy products.

John: “prevent
Elli from eating
more than two
daily dairy
products.”
Smart-fridge:
“You exceeded
daily dairy cap;
dairy drawer is
locked until
tomorrow.”

Private company:
“prevent category
X users from
eating more than
two daily dairies,
unless they are by
brand B.”
Smart-fridge: “You
exceeded daily
non-brand B dairy
cap; dairy drawer is
locked until
tomorrow, brand B
is available in the
top shelf.”

Prevention John: “prevent
me from eating
more than two
daily dairy
products.
Smart-fridge:
“You exceeded
daily dairy cap;
dairy drawer is
locked until
tomorrow.”

15-DEC-21
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State initiated
limitation
State: “It is
recommended for
category X users not
exceed two daily
dairy products;
operators must
inform users.”
Operator: “inform
category X users
about the
recommendation.”
Smart-fridge: “FDA
recommends that you
will not eat more
than two daily
dairies.
State: “It is
recommended for
category X users not
to exceed two daily
dairy products;
operators should
nudge users.”
Operator: “Nudge
user to eat less than
two dairy products
per day.”
Smart-Fridge: “You
exceeded your daily
recommended dairy
consumption:
- “To take dairy, say
the password.”
or
- Rearranging
products to hide
dairy until
tomorrow.
State: “It is forbidden
for people of
category X to eat
more than five daily
dairy products.”
Private company:
“Prevent category X
users from eating
more than five
dairies per day.”
Smart-fridge: “You
exceeded daily dairy
cap; dairy drawer is
locked until
tomorrow.”
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The table above illustrates how personalization of smart-devices
play out from the user’s perspective, namely by combining the operators imposing them and the constraint method used. It showcases how
personalization policies limit users and drive them to action, and underscores the influence smart-devices’ personalization policies can
have, even when aimed at seemingly simple and innocent issues such
as access to dairy products. In doing so, it invites the readers to use
their intuition regarding the desirability of such personalization policies. The reader’s reaction to the idea that their smart-fridge will rearrange their products, ask for a password, or stop them from taking
dairy products, by orders of the state, private company, or other users
can tell the reader something about the need to regulate those operators and actions.
To a legal audience, the table also sheds light on the broad range of
legal issues involved in personalization by smart-devices. It blends relationships between state, private companies, and users, as well as various methods for imposing constraints. In turn, it shows that
personalization of smart-devices raises a myriad of legal questions, including the regulation of commercial and compelled speech,171 antitrust and consumer protection concerns,172 quasi-regulatory questions
about constructing individuals’ choices,173 as well as contract, torts,
and fiduciary duties.174 Such regulatory variety makes any attempt to
regulate personalization policies by smart-devices extremely challenging and case-specific.
However, before rushing to analyze the personalization of smartdevices in light of any specific legal doctrine, it might be wise to take a
step back and normatively evaluate the situation. One way to norma171. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Wettengel, Reconciling the Consumer “Right to Know” with the Corporate Right to First Amendment Protection, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 325 (2017); Colleen Smith, A
Spoonful of (Added) Sugar Helps the Constitution Go Down: Curing the Compelled Commercial
Speech Doctrine with FDA’s Added Sugars Rule, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 442 (2016); Andrew M.
Osarchuk, An Argument for Public Health and Doctrinal Clarity: Why the Supreme Court Should
Overturn R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 265 (2013).
172. See generally Bill Batchelor & Grant Murray, Internet of Things: Antitrust concerns in the
pipeline?, KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG (May 12, 2016), http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2016/05/12/internet-of-things-antitrust-concerns-in-the-pipeline/
; D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1129 (2016); Marc J. Veilleux, Jr., “Alexa, Can You Buy Whole Foods?” An Analysis of the
Intersection of Antitrust Enforcement and Big Data in the Amazon-Whole Foods Merger, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 481, 493, 495, 507, 510 (2019); Kathryn McMahon, Tell the Smart House
to Mind its Own Business!: Maintaining Privacy and Security in the Era of Smart Devices, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2018).
173. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 164; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168; Lavi, supra
note 64.
174. Crootof, supra note 41, at 646–60.
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tively evaluate the (un)desirability of personalization policies, and respectively the need for regulation that protects from it, is by focusing
on potential harms to users’ freedoms—hindering negative freedoms
or burdening users’ freedom of choice to a higher degree.175 When
operators limit individual users from pursuing actions that they are
otherwise free to pursue, they limit users’ negative freedom (i.e., the
freedom to act undisturbed).176 When operators qualify the range of
actions that individual users can pursue, they burden users’ freedom
of choice.177
The combination of the kind of actors and constraint method used,
articulated in the table above, can help us assess the harm to users’
freedoms. Discussing this intersection would not provide an accurate
evaluation of harm to the users’ freedom, but it can provide an ordinal
scale that will help assess the (un)desirability of each policy in comparison to the others. To do that, we need first to scale the objectionability of each method and operator.
Previously, I scaled the different methods of constraint according to
the stringency of the limitation they impose on users.178 The objectionability of constraining operators can be scaled using the perspective of users’ freedom. Arguably, the greater the ability of the user to
influence (i.e., meaningfully consent to or reject) the actions of the
operators that initiated the imposed constraint, the less normatively
objectionable the operators’ actions are.179 Following this view, operators with whom users are more directly connected are less objectionable. Accordingly, self-imposed constraints are least normatively
objectionable, since they can be traced back to the person’s own free
will.180 Other operators are respectively ordinally situated based on
175. The distinction between freedom to decide and the freedom to act upon a decision dates
back to Thomas Hobbes, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME & POWER
OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL, ch. 21 (Penguin Books, 1985) (originally
published 1660); PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND
POLITICS 134–36 (2008).
176. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 193–98
(Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1997) (developing the distinction between positive and
negative freedom); Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Zalta N. Edward ed., 2018).
177. Ian Carter, Choice, freedom, and freedom of choice, 22 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 61, 69
(2004) (“A person has freedom of choice if she lacks constraints on the reasoned selection and
performance of one or more of the items on an action-menu.”).
178. Supra Part III.A.2.
179. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 102, 114–15 (arguing that choosing between modes of
choice architecture that best promote freedom, boils down to assumptions about users’ ability to
make good choices and the architects’ reliability).
180. See, e.g., Berlin, supra note 176, at 194 (noting that freedom is hindered only if one is
limited by others).
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the proximity of the user to the constraining operator as follows: other
users,181 followed by private companies,182 and finally, the state (considered most objectionable).183,184
Following those assumptions, upper left boxes are the more freedom preserving and, therefore less normatively objectionable; and
lower right boxes are most freedom restrictive, and therefore more
normatively objectionable.
Admittedly, qualifications could be raised against this simplified articulation; its underlying assumptions can be challenged and its broad
perspective can be more finely detailed. The value of this birds-eye
view is in elucidating the intricate scheme of personalization constraints that smart-devices users are exposed to, and thereby enrich
our intuitions and understanding about the (un)desirability of personalization policies by various operators.
C. Towards Legal Intervention II – The Distribution of Legal
Powers to Operate Smart-Devices
This part will take another step towards constructing a legal response to personalization of smart-devices by mapping out the distribution of physical and legal powers to operate the smart-devices. To
181. Perhaps the most interesting and confusing case is the justification of legal power for
inter-user personalizations. Some instances seem clear and persuasive, such as granting parents
the legal powers to limit their children’s use of the smart-fridge. Other instances seem very objectionable, such as allowing a person to bully their spouse by limiting their access to the smartfridge. On the intra-users application personalization, see supra Part I.B. The trouble is that
distinguishing between these cases requires a mechanism that identifies the different relationships between the users of every device, and distributes legal powers accordingly. I shall elaborate on these questions and mechanisms later. See infra Part IV.B.
182. A recent example of users’ ability to influence private-companies more efficiently than
governments is the public pressure that made PornHub change their content-moderation policies: Nicholas Kristof, The Children of Pornhub, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/opinion/sunday/pornhub-rape-trafficking.html.
183. Various considerations support the objection to the state’s use of personalization using
smart-devices. While state actions to limit individuals’ freedom is often justified in different manners, state-initiated personalized policies that rely on smart-devices would likely face difficult
questions about legitimacy of algorithmic decision-making, and the values that are optimized by
the algorithm used. While the state regularly holds legal powers to apply personalized regulations using laws, applying those regulations using smart-devices seems unduly invasive, and is
even more troubling with stringent constraint methods. On these, see generally Solon Barocas &
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Emily Berman, A
Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277 (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman,
Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613 (2019); Aziz Z.
Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020)
184. These are mere assumptions that could not be established here. I concede that other
orders might be possible: limitations by private companies can seem worse than limitations by
the state, since the state’s actions are assumed to be legitimate as representing the people and
working for them; and limitation by other users can be particularly difficult to challenge.
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achieve this, it is helpful to revisit the work of Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, who explored the nature of legal relations and entitlements.
Hohfeld distinguished between legal power and the physical power to
exercise it.185 According to this view, having physical power to operate
the functions of the smart-device does not necessarily coincide with
having the legal powers to operate it.186 There are two meanings of
legal power that are relevant to our discussion: legal power as the ability to use something, and legal power as the ability to make changes in
legal relations. The two kinds of legal powers can be respectively explained as first-order power, meaning the ability to operate the smartdevice; and second-order power, meaning the ability to decide who
gets first-order legal power to operate the smart-device.187 Thus, having a legal power to operate the smart-device can amount to either
legally using the different functions of the smart-fridge, or deciding
who can legally use it, or both. Crucially, distributing legal powers to
some actors ought to be normatively justified.188
Hohfeld explained that legal power correlates with legal liability,
meaning that Adam’s power subjects Ben to liability for some change
of legal relations. For instance, when Adam sends a letter to Ben with
an offer to sell some land for a specific price, Ben has correlating
power to accept the offer and thus finalize the sale, making Adam
liable to pass on the land. Liability, in this sense, is to be understood
as legal responsibility, which could have monetary consequences.189
Liability is the jural opposite of immunity, i.e., exemption or freedom
from legal responsibility. If Ben has immunity regarding something,
Adam has no power to wield over Ben with regard to that thing; thus,
185. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld (1913)]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). See
also COHEN, supra note 74.
186. Leif Wenar, Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Zalta N. Edward ed.,
2015). Cf. Joseph Raz, Normative Powers (revised), at 6 (Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. Working
Paper, Paper No. 14-629, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2460
(using a similar distinction to discuss the nature of normative powers, emphasizing that while
someone may have the power to perform some act, they may be (normatively) directed not to do
it).
187. Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 827–34 (1993);
see also Hohfeld (1913), supra note 185, at 45–46. Cf. Raz, supra note 186 (noting that one
should distinguish between normative powers that originate from exercising a legal power by
another person (i.e., a chained power), and powers that originate otherwise (basic power)).
188. One way to justify someone having a normative power (or having a valid normative
power) lies on the bearer of the power having an undefeated value that justifies having such
power, see Raz, supra note 186, at 4, 7, 9.
189. See Hohfeld (1913), supra note 185, at 50–54; David Campbell & Philip Thomas, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING BY WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD (2001).
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if Ben has immunity they are not liable.190 This distribution of physical
and legal powers and liabilities regarding the smart-device is the jurisprudential foundation for regulating the operation of smart-devices.
1. First-Order Legal Power
Let us begin with first-order legal powers to operate smart-devices.
Sometimes operators hold legal powers to operate functions of the
smart-device which are not available to the user. Aaron Perzanowski
and Jason Schultz noted that manufacturers use smart-devices to limit
users’ usage of devices, and surveyed the accompanying changes of
legal powers to operate the smart-devices.191 More recent scholarly
discussions about such distribution of legal powers to operate the
smart-devices include contributions about the smart-devices’ liability
regimes192 and about users’ power to modify or repair the smart-device.193 Previous parts of this Article that explained operators’ ability
to impose personalization schemes using smart-devices, compliment
this scholarship.
In Hohfeldian terms, in all those cases users are legally disabled
against operators’ powers to operate the device in such instances,
meaning that those operators are legally immune from claims that the
user may have regarding the operation of the device. Such distribution
of legal powers allows operators to impose limitations on users without any legal ramifications.194 This leaves the users legally disabled or
legally unable to perform certain actions regarding the device or to
defy undesired actions by the operators.195
An interesting question arises about the nature of this first-order
legal power to operate smart-devices. Some might see it as a property
right derived from ownership over the device,196 others might suggest
that it is merely a limited property right, distinct from the property
right of possession of the smart-device,197 yet even others might sug190. Hohfeld (1913), supra note 185, at 54–58.
191. AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 139–40, 146, 152 (2016).
192. For a related discussion see Jane E. Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Rewriting the “Book of the
Machine”: Regulatory and Liability Issues for the Internet of Things, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
455, 500–12 (2018); Crootof, supra note 41; Bethany Corbin, Liability for the Internet of Things,
21 TORT SOURCE 11 (2019).
193. See Kilovaty, supra note 42, at 458, 462–63; Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Smart
Cars, Telematics and Repair, 54 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 283 (2021).
194. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
195. See Hohfeld (1913), supra note 185; the text next to supra note 38 and forth.
196. See, e.g., Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 193, § I.A (making a similar argument for the
right to repair).
197. See, e.g., JOSHUA WEISSMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY: POSSESSION AND USE 9–53 (2005).
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gest that it is a contractual right, based on an incomplete contract that
can be modified and specified by the seller.198 The nature of the legal
power will affect the distribution of others’ legal powers over the
smart-device, and thus its regulation. Based on the technological preface articulated above, it is my intuition that the legal power to operate
some function of the smart-device, including the power to personalize
the device, is some sort of property right which is distinct from ownership or possession and can be held simultaneously by multiple actors.
Explicating this view exceeds the scope of this paper.
Moving on, if operating smart-devices and applying personalization
schemes is a legal power, distributing it to some actor must be justified.199 Arguably, the legal power to apply personalization policies using smart-devices should be distributed between operators and users
in such a manner that does not grant operators full immunity from
users and that users are not fully disabled. One reason supporting this
view is that personalization of smart-devices is one-directional: it impacts users and not the operators.200 As explained in the previous
part, users’ diminished ability to influence the operators’ actions (that
impact the user) is assumed to be more difficult to justify than operators’ actions that the users can leverage.201
Another reason not to grant operators full legal immunity in operating smart-devices stems from users’ expectations. Users have certain
expectations concerning their legal relationships with their traditional
devices, which influence the legal regulation of such devices and are
affected by it.202 Since smart-devices usually launch on the basis of the
traditional devices, the “smart” capabilities or features are added to
the traditional ones.203 In this sense, the smart-device and the traditional devices are, at least initially, the same “thing”—and thus the
users’ pre-digitized expectations about the traditional device echo the
smart-device.204 Arguably, since personalization policies—especially
the constraints and limitations that are bundled with them—were not
technologically possible in the traditional devices, users’ expectations
for those devices do not include the limitations brought about by the
personalization policies.205 Moreover, even if the users had accurate
198. Id.
199. See supra note 188.
200. See supra Part III.B.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 178–84.
202. See, e.g., Crootof, supra note 41, at 623–24.
203. See supra Part I.A.
204. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 46, at 815–16. On the argument that traditional and
smart are the same “thing,” see supra note 2.
205. See ZUBOFF, supra note 64; supra notes 191–93.
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expectations towards smart-device operations when they bought
them, those might become irrelevant because smart-devices are prone
to change via software updates much more rapidly than comparable
traditional devices.206 While these changes might be expected in
smartphones or Internet services like social media or search engines,
they are rarely expected in fridges or cars.207 This discrepancy is accentuated in those smart-devices that are not as frequently bought: the
longer the user has the smart-device, the more modifications will
likely occur, and thus expands the gap between users’ original expectations and the actual operation of the device.208 Respectively, the justification to grant operators the legal power to apply whatever
personalization policies they choose using smart-devices diminishes.
2. Second-Order Legal Power
Smart-devices brought considerable change to the distribution of
second-order legal powers. Since operating traditional devices required the operators to be in the same space and time as the device,
the physical powers to operate traditional devices were limited to
those that had physical access to it.209 This meant that sellers would
not have a significant incentive to achieve legal powers to operate
traditional devices, and that the distinction between operators and
users was of little practical significance. Therefore, until smart-devices
came along, the question about deciding who gets to operate the device—and who decides that decision—was theoretical question at
best.
Smart-devices changed that. Remote operability of smart-devices
allowed operators to transcend the time and space challenges, de facto
making it easier for operators to exercise physical powers over the
device.210 Interestingly, such redistribution of physical powers to operate the smart-device—from the users’ unique ability to remote operability of multiple operators—revitalizes actors’ interests to hold
second-order legal powers and to shape how legal powers to operate
206. More about the changing expectations of similar things becoming smart, see generally
Graham Johnson, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Why Changing Expectations Demand
Heightened Standards, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 345 (2019) (discussing the expectations of privacy for similar things when they turn smart). About the different expectations regarding the
new device of the smart-phone (but not the information stored in it), see Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014) (holding that “[p]rior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a
cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it is the
person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception”).
207. See Johnson, supra note 206.
208. See id.
209. See supra Part I.A.
210. Id.
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smart-devices will be distributed.211 In practice, market incentives and
the current property regime favor private companies—namely sellers
and manufacturers—allowing them to distribute smart-devices’ operating powers as they see fit.212 This led to the current situation, in
which operators hold objectionable legal powers over the devices and
often leave users powerless and legally-disabled.213
But this second-order legal power grab is not a fait accompli. Our
second-order distribution doctrines are themselves contingent, and
there are viable alternatives. One alternative model is adopting the
traditional-fridge framework, in which by buying the smart-device, the
user gets all first and second-order legal powers, leaving the distribution of legal powers in the users’ hands.214 Other alternatives include
regulating a default bundle of minimum legal powers that users of
smart-devices get when buying the device;215 identifying specific users’
rights regarding the operation of smart-devices and the limitations
that ought to be imposed on other operators to secure these rights;216
rethinking our views about property rights altogether;217 or perhaps
imposing more significant public law duties on the sellers should they
wish to retain such powers.218 The most thought-provoking arguments
call for reimagining the property regime altogether to better serve the
growing economic and informational power of some actors over
users.219
211. See supra notes 191–93.
212. Id. The most prominent example of this second-order power-grab are the operation moderators, see infra Part IV.B.
213. See supra notes 194–95.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 209–10.
215. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 859–61; Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things:
Industry Impact, Standardization Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 212
(2016). Both suggest that owners of smart-devices should have some powers over functions of
those devices. While they only mentioned in passing general interest in information and data and
interests in ownership of health data specifically, we might think about other interests for operating smart-devices such as exclusive power to lock or unlock the compartments of smart-fridges.
216. James Bonar-Bridges, Regulating Virtual Property with Eulas, 2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 79 (2016); Kenneth W. Eng, Content Creators, Virtual Goods: Who Owns Virtual Property?, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. 249 (2016) (Both discuss the claims of gamers from the
sellers of online games.).
217. See, e.g., M. Scott Boone, Ubiquitous Computing, Virtual Worlds, and the Displacement
of Property Rights, 4 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 91, 124–31 (2008); Lothar Determann, No
One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2018) (interestingly arguing that the data that IoT devices produce is not governed by rights at all, and therefore no one owns it, challenging the
notion of personal data generally).
218. See supra note 158.
219. See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 64; Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020);
Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460 (2020).
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The discussion about the adequacy of the existing distribution of
second-order legal powers over the operations of smart-devices exceeds the scope of this Article. For my purposes, suffice to emphasize
that this distribution is qualitatively different in the age of smart-devices. Remote operability made operators much more important, and
the question of “Who decides who can operate the smart-device?” is a
crucial consideration for any future attempt to regulate the field.
IV. PERSONALIZATION

BY

PRIME-OPERATORS

Some smart-device operators stand out. Like ordinary operators,
they have legitimate access to operate the digital functions of the
smart device, and they can use this access to personalize its operation,
as previously discussed. However, while the operators discussed thus
far were assumed to operate specific functions in a handful of smartdevices, the ones we turn to now are professional operators, who create systems that operate and personalize enormous amounts of functions and smart-devices. As the following discussion will illustrate,
these operators have two distinct features that single them out from
other operators: significantly improved ability to collect information
and make inferences that are relevant for personalization, and significantly greater access to operate smart-devices alongside other operators. These two aspects provide those actors with considerable
advantages over other operators, granting them the title of primeoperators.
A. Informational, Economic, and Computational Advantages
Earlier, I explained that personalization involves using the smartdevices’ sensors to collect information about the user and that more
information facilitates better and more nuanced personalization policies.220 Operators use this information to personalize the operation of
the smart-device221—to learn about trends of use, preferences, responses, or the condition of the device, and respectively choose the
adequate operating response to various contingencies.222 This process
220. See supra Part II.B.
221. See, e.g., IoT Is Building Higher Levels Of Customer Engagement, FORBES INSIGHTS
(June 14, 2018, 11:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-inteliot/2018/06/14/iot-is-building-higher-levels-of-customer-engagement/#2117787d7d87. Some argue that the profiling information should be shared between companies, see, e.g., Kurt Collins, A case for making it easier
to personalize IoT devices, TECHBEACON, https://techbeacon.com/app-dev-testing/case-makingit-easier-personalize-iot-devices (last visited July 11, 2021). On the privacy concerns that this
raises, see 2016 O.J. (L 679) 119; Makker, supra note 19.
222. See, e.g., FORBES INSIGHTS, supra note 221; Ferguson, supra note 14, at 818; Nikole Davenport, Smart Washers May Clean Your Clothes, But Hacks Can Clean Out Your Privacy, and

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-3\DPL306.txt

538

unknown

Seq: 42

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

15-DEC-21

9:35

[Vol. 70:497

of collecting information and making inferences to personalize the operation of smart-devices peaks with Personal Assistant Services (hereinafter, PAS) such as Siri, Alexa, or Google Assistant.223 The
information PASs collect about the user from the particular smartdevice is combined with information they collect from other sources,
including information from other smart-devices or from other services
they operate.224 Based on this aggregation, PASs can better answer
users’ needs, and therefore lure in more users, which in turn provides
even more information, continuing the cycle.225
By operating multiple sensors in millions of devices, prime-operators can observe countless comparable products and aggregate various
information about specific products. The ability to continuously generate information about products located in smart-fridges—big data
about such products—is a new feature facilitated by innovative technology that only actors that operate millions of smart-devices can take
advantage of.226 Using this data, the operators can make inferences
Underdeveloped Regulations Could Leave You Hanging on a Line, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO.
TECH. & PRIV. L. 259, 268–70 (2016).
223. See, e.g., Dan Feldman & Eldar Haber, Measuring and Protecting Privacy in the AlwaysOn Era, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 197, 219 (2020) (discussing data collected by Amazon’s Echo);
David K. A. Mordecai, Automated Personal Assistants with Multiple Principals: Whose Agent Is
It?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/science_technology/
publications/scitech_lawyer/2020/winter/automated-personal-assistants-multiple-principalswhose-agent-it/; Tom Mighell, The Modern Personal Digital Assistant, LAW PRAC. MAG., Jan./
Feb. 2016, at 30. For a technological explanation on PAS’s operation of several devices, see
Understand the Smart Home Skill API, AMAZON ALEXA, https://developer.amazon.com/en-US/
docs/alexa/smarthome/understand-the-smart-home-skill-api.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2020);
Daniel Myers, IoT & Google Assistant, MEDIUM (Jan. 22, 2019), https://medium.com/googledevelopers/iot-google-assistant-f0908f354681.
224. See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 30, at 122–24.
225. As Stucke & Grunes explain, “[T]he more people who actively or passively contribute
data, the more the company can improve the quality of its product, the more attractive the
product is to other users, the more data the company has to further improve its product, which
becomes more attractive to prospective users.” See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES,
BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 170 (2016). Network theory relates to this as preferential
treatment mechanism, or “the rich get richer” effect, see, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg et al.,
Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion”, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1308 (2006). See also Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1199; Matt Day,
Your smart light can tell Amazon and Google when you go to bed, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-12/your-smart-light-can-tell-amazon-andgoogle-when-you-go-to-bed. On the antitrust concerns that this causes, see generally supra note
172.
226. A useful definition of big data is “the collection of large amounts of data or information
and the ability to analyze it in a meaningful way.” See Christopher C. French, The Big Data
Revolution and Its Impact on the Law, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 585 (2019). For a discussion about
the difficulties of other actors to collect, access and use such big data, see generally Daniel L.
Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339 (2017).
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about the traits of similar products and apply those to make predictions about specific products in specific smart-fridges.227
By combining informational advantages with superior data analysis
capabilities, prime-operators can personalize the smart-devices in
ways that other operators could not.228 Collecting such data, conducting such analysis, and providing such inferences are relatively
cheap for prime-operators, especially once smart-devices are in extensive use, and they employ massive data analysis processes precisely for
these reasons.229 Gathering those inferences is not only cheaper for
prime-operators, it is realistically almost always available only to
them—given their unique access to millions of data points.230 Moreover, once such inference is found, discovering traits and features of
specific products in specific smart-fridges is even easier and
cheaper.231
Consider two examples that illustrate how prime-operators can
gather information that other operators could not (or would have
trouble gathering) and use it to prevent physical harms to users.
First, consider a drug that must be refrigerated and cannot be used
thirty days after its first use. Tom felt sick one day, bought the drug,
used it, and stored it in the smart-fridge. After a few days of use, he
felt better and forgot about the drug. The prime-operator could use
sensors inside the device to track Tom’s consumption of this drug—to
find out exactly what kind of drug it is, what its expiration date is,
when it was first used, infer how much time has passed since, how
many doses Tom used and how many more he should use, and when
227. This is standard practice for the application of big data, see, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMBIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 1–12 (2016); STUCKE & GRUNES,
supra note 225, at ch. 2; Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are
Changing the Attorney’s Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 527, 559–74 (2015); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 253 (2013) (explaining the predictive analysis benefits of bigdata).
228. The use of big data to personalize is similar in the case of smart-devices and in other
platforms. Yochai Benkler put this point well: “Big data collection and processing, combined
with ubiquitous sensing and connectivity, create extremely powerful insights on mass populations available to relatively few entities. These insights, together with new computational methods, make up what we think of as ‘big data.’ As Zeynep Tufekci has explained, when these
methods combine with widespread experimentation (as in the Facebook experiments), behavioral science that analyzes individuals in a stimulus-response framework, and increasingly onthe-fly personalization of platforms, platform companies can nudge users to form beliefs and
preferences, follow behaviors, and increase the probability of outcomes with ever-finer precision.” Benkler, supra note 74, at 23.
229. Id.; see supra notes 225–27.
230. See supra note 226.
231. See supra notes 225–27.
MISSION,

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-3\DPL306.txt

540

unknown

Seq: 44

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

15-DEC-21

9:35

[Vol. 70:497

the last date of use should be.232 In this case, the prime-operator could
prevent the injury that might be caused to Tom if he were to consume
the drug after the expiration date or against the recommended
amount for use. Preventing this damage is relatively cheap and easy
for the prime-operator once it has the technology to monitor the products in the smart-fridge.233 Since individuals tend to be bad at tasks
such as remembering expiration dates or counting doses over days,
prime-operators can use their abilities to provide valuable social
services.234
Second, a prime-operator might examine millions of milk jugs and
find that when the milk turns sour, the bottle or package expands at
some measure that is identifiable by the devices’ sensors. The inference provided by the prime-operator about the milk would be more
nuanced, and arguably more accurate, than the expiration date that is
ordinarily mentioned on the packages, since the former analyzes the
condition of the specific product while the latter is general. Achieving
this information requires resources for collecting and analyzing copious amounts of data, which in turn requires access to millions of
equivalent products and computing powers to make significant inferences about them.235 In practice, this information is uniquely available
to prime-operators.
In both examples, prime-operators translate their considerable informational and technological advantages into a (comparatively)
cheap and effective ability to accurately detect possible future physical
harms to users. Once detected, prime-operators could use the features
of the smart-fridge to notify the user about the harm or otherwise
prevent them from misusing the products in the smart-fridge.236 While
in theory, such data collection and inferences can be achieved by
every operator, practical limitations of scale, money, and computing
232. Needless to say, gathering such information is already technologically possible for many
smart-fridges, and many more will have such abilities in the near future. See Stables, supra note
2; Dami Lee, Samsung and LG go head to head with AI-powered fridges that recognize food, THE
VERGE (Jan. 2, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/2/21046822/samsung-lg-smartfridge-family-hub-instaview-thinq-ai-ces-2020.
233. See supra notes 226–31.
234. Gal, supra note 43, at 76–91.
235. See supra notes 226–27.
236. Arguably, such informational advantage and social value might justify holding PASs liable for not preventing such damages. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV 1089 (1972); Steven Shavell,
Liability for Accidents, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 139 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, eds., 2007); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability For
Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141 (2020).
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powers make those skills uniquely available to a handful of primeoperators. To conclude, those prime-operators have significant advantages in creating and refining the operation of smart-devices, which
allows them to benefit (or harm) users in unique ways.237
B. Moderating Powers
The remote operability of smart-devices invites more actors into the
relationship between the user and the smart-device.238 These additional actors, the operators, can have access to different digital functions of the smart-device and activate those to impose personalization
and constraints on users.239 So far, our discussion assumed that only
one operator operates the device at any given time. To probe this assumption, let us distinguish between access and operation to smartdevices.
Interconnectivity of smart-devices allows multiple operators to access the smart-device and send commands to its digitized functions. In
ordinary cases, nothing limits mutual access to the digital functions by
different users at the same time.240 However, access to the smart-devices and operation of the smart-devices are different. While access
relates to the ability to connect and send commands to the device, the
operation of the device also involves making its physical functions
perform certain actions or carry out certain personalization policies.
Importantly, unlike access to the code that operates the smart-device,
operating smart-devices’ physical functions and using those to apply
personalization policies is often rivalrous—one actor’s operation of
the smart-device often hinders another’s.241
Consider a simple situation: two operators wish to set the smartfridge’s temperature. Both operators have access to the smart-device
and can send commands to the digitized thermostat that controls the
device’s temperature. When Anne sets the temperature to 35°F and
Ben sets it to 39°F, their desired operation of the device becomes
rivalrous since the two choices contradict one another and are mutually exclusive. Naturally, since smart-devices facilitate much more
complicated operating scenarios, as discussed above, a wide array of
conflicts are expected between the different operators operating the
device. For instance, conflicting personalization policies can involve
237. As noted, these raise antitrust concerns, see supra note 172.
238. See supra Part I.A.
239. See supra Part III.
240. See supra note 26.
241. On the rivalrousness of codes, see, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U.
L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2005).
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one operator limiting a certain user from consuming more than one
beer per day, while another might set the limitation at two beers.
Conflicting operation of smart-devices by different operators is a
problem that requires solutions in the form of rules. Consider a simple
rule determining that commands will be executed whenever they are
received, regardless of other commands. Continuing our previous example, upon Anne’s command, the smart-fridge’s temperature will be
set at 35°F, but later will be changed to 39°F upon Ben’s command. In
this case, the rule that was set resulted in Anne’s operation being
overridden by Ben’s. Thus, in practice, operator Ben’s power and expectation of being able to operate the device trumped Anne’s powers
and expectation. The desirability of such outcome depends on the details of the case—we might favor it if Anne is the virtual assistant that
the manufacturer operates and Ben is the user, and we might object to
it if Anne is the parent and Ben is the neighbor’s child.
More to our point, any rule aimed to solve the conflicting operation
of smart-devices is designed and applied by someone.242 Prime-operators determine and apply the rules that govern the operation of smartdevices, they hold the power to decide which operation will prevail in
different circumstances.243 This is the moderating power of the primeoperators.
Since smart-devices technology empowers different operators to operate the smart-devices in ways that often conflict,244 rules that govern
the operation of different operators are inevitable. This, in turn,
makes the prime-operators—actors that moderate the operation of
smart-devices, determine the rules, and apply them—also necessary.245 Prime-operators face difficult questions as they use their moderating powers to solve conflicts between operators. Importantly, like
other moderators of innovative technologies, prime-operators are
compelled to weigh in on those questions and cannot hide behind a
veil of neutrality.246
In using their moderating powers, prime-operators ought to face
questions like: Should parents be allowed to limit the speed of the car
242. Cf. supra note 98.
243. Arguably, they hold second-order legal powers to determine who operates the device,
see supra Part III.C.
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. See supra Part IV.B.
246. On choice architecture see generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168. On the aneutrality of technology regulation, see generally Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 24 (2012); Marcelo Thompson, The Neutralization
of Harmony: The Problem Of Technological Neutrality, East and West, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 303 (2012).
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for their children? Or their beer consumption? If so, until what age?
And could these regulations be applied remotely, say, when their children move to another state?247 On a different note, could private companies be allowed to buy access to smart-devices operations? If so,
from whom? And would user-operators be able to override those
companies’ operations?248 Also, would the state be allowed to operate
features of smart-devices—either as broad policies applied by the
prime-operator or specific operations directed to specific people?249
Could user-operators override the state’s operation?250 More generally, when could users override the constraints imposed by certain operators?251 Who can the user approach if they have been wronged by
such an operation?252 And what should be the legal standard of review for such a claim?
In many cases, the prime-operators that hold moderating powers
will be the PAS. PASs often create the technological infrastructure
that facilitates the operation of different smart-devices for other actors, from users to manufacturers.253 Relatedly, their wide reach allows them to operate various kinds of smart-devices, strengthening
their moderating powers.254 Their informational and market advantages make users and sellers alike more inclined to use PASs’ moderating services.255 PASs also use those powers to force customers to use
their moderating services, as part of a “take it or leave it” deal for the
entire smart-device.256 All those features drive most users and operators to rely on PASs for the operation of smart-devices. By creating
the platforms that all other operators use to operate the devices, PASs
assume the role of prime-operators.257 They are the ones that have to
247. See supra notes 46–51.
248. See supra notes 140–43, 157–59, 216–21. For instance, the Samsung smart-fridge warranty
limits the users power to contact third-parties to change or modify the device under penalty of
limited warranty, see SAMSUNG, REFRIGERATOR: USER MANUAL 13.
249. See supra Part I.A.2.
250. See supra note 160–62.
251. See, e.g., Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 193, § I, III (arguing for a regulatory change
that would ensure users’ right to repair smart-device); see Kilovaty, supra note 42 (arguing for
hacker’s right to hack smart-devices to audit the code for risks to consumers).
252. This could be operator’s services such as Facebook’s Board, see generally Kate Klonick,
The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free
Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2424–25 (2020). Or a state-operated mechanism such as the
consumer protection, see McMahon, supra note 172.
253. See supra note 225.
254. See supra Part IV.A.
255. ZUBOFF, supra note 64, at ch. 10; Crootof, supra note 41; Benkler, supra note 74.
256. This is sometimes referred to as partnership transfers of data. See, e.g., ERIN EGAN,
DATA PORTABILITY AND PRIVACY 10 (2019).
257. Cf. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 191, at ch. 2, 8 (arguing that manufacturers
have similar powers for similar reasons).
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set the rules regarding the conflicting operation of smart-devices by
different operators using their platforms.258 Therefore, they are the
ones that currently answer the questions posed in the previous
paragraph.259
Given prime-operators’ powers to moderate personalized constraints using smart-devices, a laissez-faire regulatory policy is not
likely to safeguard users’ interests.260 Such approach merely leaves
users at the mercy of more powerful private actors, who often bear no
liability in regard to users’ interest being trampled by operators.261
Thus, prime-operators’ moderating powers call for a change of focus:
while with regards to ordinary operators, the question was “Should we
allow them to operate?” with regards to prime-operators’ moderating
powers, the question is rather “How should we guide their
moderation?”
We should start thinking about smart-devices’ prime-operators
much like content moderators on social media, as the actors that set
the rules regarding what can be done on the platforms they control.262
Like content moderators in social media, prime-operators should not
be allowed to hide behind a false façade of neutrality. Considering the
physical aspect of smart-devices’ operation263 and the expected prevalence of smart-devices,264 developing scholarship that confronts the
regulations of prime-operators is vital. The next and final Part of this
Article will take the first steps in that direction.
C. Before Legal Intervention
The regulation of prime-operators is more complicated than the
regulation of ordinary operators. While prime-operator’s immense
power, as identified here, might be intimidating and itself might justify
some regulatory intervention,265 these powers also allow prime-operators to uncover great social benefits that would probably be spared if
those actors would be regulated to a freeze.266 In addition, the regula258. See supra Part II.C.1; Grimmelmann, supra note 96, at 1729.
259. This is a contingent situation, as indirect legal regulation of such moderation is always
available and often advisable. See, e.g., Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for
a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 405 (2019); infra Part IV.C.
260. See Berlin, supra note 176.
261. See supra note 210–13; see also Crootof, supra note 41.
262. See generally James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 42
(2015); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).
263. See supra notes 55–56, 73–74.
264. See supra note 7.
265. See supra note 215–19.
266. See supra notes 232–37.
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tion of prime-operators involves complicated questions about regulating private actors that themselves regulate other operators.267 These
questions cannot be swept aside by adopting a laissez-faire approach,
which merely shifts the burden to the prime-operators to make all the
hard choices.268
Luckily, developing regulation against this background—the social
interest in unveiling unknown benefits and the inherent need to moderate alongside the desire for proper moderation—is not unheard of.
It resembles the conditions for the regulation of a similar technology
at a similar developmental stage to that of smart-devices today: the
Internet in the late 1990s. Following is a very brief presentation of this
familiar story.
In the dawn of the Internet age, a question arose about the liability
of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and websites in terms of content
that users publish on their platforms.269 Two of the earliest cases that
discussed this issue reached opposite conclusions: while one held that
the ISPs were not liable for content published on its site, the other
held that it is responsible for the content published on it, and hence,
liable for legal claims regarding such content.270
Understanding the enormous potential of the Internet as a new
sphere for deliberation and speech holding previously unimaginable
possibilities, neither conclusion was satisfactory. On one hand, it
warned companies that by developing content-sharing platforms for
the Internet, they might be held liable for considerable damages for
user-generated content published on their platforms. On the other
hand, it incentivized those companies that do invest in the field to
refrain from any content vetting, since too much control would deem
them liable. In simple terms, websites that wanted to develop the Internet could either adopt the 4chan.org model of non-intervention or
risk liability, clearly a disconcerting choice.

267. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Pike, Defending Data: Toward Ethical Protections and Comprehensive Data Governance, 69 EMORY L.J. 687 (2020).
268. See supra notes 260–61.
269. On the familiar story of Section 230, see generally Ryan French, Picking up the Pieces:
Finding Unity after the Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. L.
REV. 443 (2012); Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230
Immunity, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505 (2015); Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Section 230(c)(1) of the
Communications Decency Act and the Common Law of Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 195, 201–11 (2018).
270. See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 11, 1995).
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Congress addressed the problem by enacting § 230 to the Communication Decency Act.271 Congress found that “[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services” holds
extraordinary opportunities for diversifying discourse, for cultural developments, and for intellectual activities.272 It held that the free market is the best way to nurture and harvest the potential fruits of the
Internet.273 To remove disincentives for private companies to both develop the Internet and filter objectionable content, Congress determined that ISPs will not be held liable for content published by users,
nor for actions taken in good faith to limit access to “objectionable”
content.274 Put simply, by enacting § 230, Congress aimed to promote
the development of the Internet as a space for robust communication.
It envisioned a vibrant network developed and self-regulated by private actors, wherein content could be shared in ways that did not seem
possible before.275
Congress was right. Private companies have, in fact, facilitated the
benefits of online content sharing for billions of people in ways that
were hardly imaginable, let alone accessible, only decades ago. They
also initiated and developed different moderating standards for the
operation of such technologies.276 While those can and should be publicly scrutinized, it is very doubtful that better platforms or more desirable rules would have been employed more quickly, had the state
not created the regulatory environment for this technology to develop. Thus, despite considerable shortfalls of today’s Internet, it is
hard to imagine how all the benefits of content sharing would have
been developed without § 230.277 Challenging this claim requires one
to explain how companies like Facebook, YouTube, Google, or Yelp
could have created their services in the first place, in light of significant damages liability at their very earliest stages.
By now, I hope the resemblance between the Internet in the 1990s
and today’s smart-devices is clearer. Both involve infant, innovative
technologies, based on interconnectivity; both hold potential for a
271. 47 U.S.C. § 230. For a discussion about these cases and the incentives for § 230, see supra
note 269.
272. § 230(a).
273. § 230(b).
274. § 230(b)–(c).
275. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Force v. Facebook, Inc.,
934 F.3d 53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019); Browne-Barbour, supra note 269, at 1519–38; French, supra note
269; Varty Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230
Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 581 (2009).
276. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 262.
277. On § 230 as regulating the “secondary liability regimes,” see Byrd & Strandburg, supra
note 260.
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myriad of social benefits, some already foreseeable and some still on
the horizon; and both are driven (at this stage) by private enterprises
that rely on unique technological abilities and market powers to create services for users. Moreover, both are built around new forms of
interaction between users and operators, and thereby, on the one
hand, require expedient regulation to protect users, and on the other
hand, should not be regulated to a halt. It is true that liability for
speech harms on Internet platforms is not synonymous with liability
for physical damages of smart-devices’ users, mainly because of the
various First Amendment considerations involved in the former and
not the latter.278 But the similarities between the cases, namely the
possibility of foregoing unknown benefits of a promising technology
and the need to develop and apply fair moderation standards for rapidly changing technologies, should not be ignored.
As long as one accepts the premises of § 230 for the regulation of
the Internet—the desirability of the technology that could provide a
myriad of avenues of human flourishing, the need to encourage such
technology by removing private companies’ disincentives to develop
it, and the ability of the operators to self-regulate279—one should at
least consider a similar regulatory approach for prime-operators of
smart-devices. Arguably, the successful development of the Internet
supports applying the same approach to smart-devices—granting
prime-operators similar legal powers to operate scores of devices. To
some extent, it also supports the legal power to moderate the use of
other operators, albeit while requiring transparency regarding the
guidelines to such moderation, which would encourage the social and
scholarly scrutiny we see regarding today’s social media
moderation.280
A few caveats are in order. The case for operators’ immunity, just
like the case for ISPs immunity, is not limitless.281 Even a free-market
policy that supports self-regulation could, and arguably should, be limited when important countervailing values are on the line.282 Moreover, this argument focuses on smart-devices technology at this
278. For the applicability of First Amendment considerations, see generally Note, Section 230
as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (2018); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31; Defterderian, supra note 275; French, supra note 271.
279. See supra notes 275–77.
280. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 262.
281. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
282. See generally Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R.
1865, 115th Cong. (2018); Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016); Browne-Barbour, supra note
269, at 1538–47; Defterderian, supra note 275, at 568.
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particular point in time. The incentives scheme discussed does not
necessarily apply when the technology becomes well-established, once
the economic benefits are more accessible, once the business risks are
diminished, or once the shortfalls of self-regulation require the attention of policymakers.283 In other words, regulatory policies can be relaxed in their infancy stage for promising technologies, but nuanced
and stricter measures will be necessary as these technologies
mature.284
CONCLUSION
The rise of smart-devices poses various legal and social challenges.
This Article focused on often-ignored legal questions that smart-devices bring to the forefront. It provided an initiatory analysis of personalization within the context of smart-devices and discussed some of
the key legal queries it raises.285 The discussion also shed muchneeded light on the operators of smart-devices. It underscored the importance of recognizing that smart-devices introduce new actors into
the relationship between users and devices, and suggested fresh perspectives towards the regulation of these new and complicated relationships.286 Finally, it also placed prime-operators on the pedestal
they deserve, by arguing that they have unique, extraordinary powers
to operate smart-devices to benefit society, while also holding powers
to moderate between different operators. As such, this Article
stressed that prime-operators of smart-devices pose challenges that resemble social media moderators, and thus, deserve equal attention
from legal scholarship and regulators.287
Another contribution that this Article offers to the complicated and
multifaceted legal scholarship about IoT and smart-devices relates to
the method of analysis pursued here. It emphasized that in order to
facilitate a meaningful debate about these topics, it is necessary to first
understand the nuts and bolts of the relevant technology.288 To wit,
this Article used a mundane and simple example of smart-fridges to
create the preface about the technology of smart-devices. This technological background was used to identify and explore concepts that are
283. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222 (2021).
284. See Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944).
285. See supra Part II.
286. See supra Part III.
287. See supra Part IV.
288. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up With
Technological Change, 2007 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239 (2007); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A
Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59
(2013).
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relevant for regulating this technology, and formed the factual basis
on which legal and regulatory questions were discussed.
This Article also wished to broaden the scope of scholarship about
smart-devices by focusing on underexplored legal paths. To this end,
various legal concerns posed by smart-devices were mostly set aside in
this Article, including personal data and privacy infringements,289
cybersecurity,290 or the Fourth Amendment.291 Vital as these may be,
legal scholarship about law and technology generally, and about
smart-devices and IoT specifically, would benefit from exploring other
questions more rigorously. While these are important topics, trying to
solve the vast legal issues that smart-devices bring forth by continuously involving and modifying those concepts is ill-advised, the extensive use weakens those legal concepts while ignoring many important
questions in the field. Significantly, this Article aimed to show how
law issues discussed in the law and technology realm can be integrated
within and contribute to well-establish legal theory discussions.
Finally, this Article sought to establish a foundation for a more
elaborate legal conversation about the challenges of smart-devices. It
included the first steps towards clarifying the role of personalization,
operators, and prime-operators within the framework of smart-devices. Doing so, it invites future contributions to hone the understanding of these issues and develop more detailed regulations to govern it.

289. For articles discussing the privacy concerns that arise from IoT, see, e.g., McMahon,
supra note 172; Stefan Ducich, These Walls Can Talk! Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart
Home Under the Fourth Amendment, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 278 (2018); Branden Ly, Never
Home Alone: Data Privacy Regulations for the Internet of Things, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 539 (2017); Laura DeNardis & Mark Raymond, The Internet of Things as a Global Policy
Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475 (2017); Alexander H. Tran, The Internet of Things and
Potential Remedies in Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 263, 265–73 (2017);
Williams, supra note 29, at 14–16, 22; Peppet, supra note 30, at 129–33.
290. See supra note 149.
291. See, e.g., Gabriel Bronshteyn, Searching the Smart Home, 72 STAN. L. REV. 455, 470–79
(2020); Haley Napier, Carpenter v. United States: The Stored Communications Act is Not a Permissible Mechanism to Obtain Data from Smart Home Devices, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 163
(2020).
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